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HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
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AND MANGOLD, AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR COMMUNITY COMPETENCE
Derrick Wyatt*
Summary: The judgments in Viking and Laval confi rm the Court’s pre-
vious case law on the horizontal effect of Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC, 
and extend the horizontal effect of Articles 43 and 49 EC to cover col-
lective action of trade unions by way of strikes, boycotts and the like. 
A signifi cant knock-on effect is an extension of Community regulatory 
competence to cover this same subject matter, despite the contrary in-
dications in Article 137(5) EC.  The judgment in Viking implies that Ar-
ticle 28 EC is also capable of horizontal effect, at least in cases where 
collective action of individuals produces regulatory effects similar to 
those resulting from State action. The Court’s reasoning leaves room 
for future incremental increases in the horizontal effect of fundamen-
tal freedoms in cases which involve contractual rules, in particular 
rules regulating employed or self employed activities. The approach 
to horizontal effect in Viking supports, for example, the argument that 
provisions of a corporate constitution could amount to a restriction on 
freedom of establishment, as could action taken by the board of a com-
pany to frustrate a takeover bid. Advocate General Maduro in Viking 
argues that the Treaty rules on freedom of movement apply directly 
to any private action that is capable of effectively restricting others 
from exercising their right of freedom of movement. The present writer 
suggests further considerations as being relevant to determining the 
extent of the horizontal reach of fundamental freedoms. Normal mar-
ket behaviour on the part of one market operator should not in prin-
ciple be held to amount to a restriction on the fundamental freedom 
of another. But discriminatory conduct by market operators, or other 
conduct which falls outside the range of normal market behaviour, 
would seem capable of falling within the horizontal effect of a funda-
mental freedom, at any rate where it restricts access of other market 
operators, or consumers, to the market, or places market operators or 
consumers at a disadvantage because they have exercised a funda-
mental freedom. Account must  be taken of the aims and wording of 
the freedom in question, along with the policy questions of whether it 
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would be excessively burdensome to make private operators subject 
to the obligation to comply with the fundamental freedom in question, 
and whether any consequential extension of Community regulatory 
competence would unreasonably limit that of the Member States.  A 
related issue to be taken into account is the possible horizontal effect 
of the fundamental principle of equality, as articulated in the Mangold 
case. Even a restrained reading of this much criticised case would 
suggest that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of national-
ity in Article 12 EC might have horizontal effect in circumstances fall-
ing within the scope of Community law, such as the supply of goods, 
services, business accommodation and housing. A similar conclusion 
could be reached as regards discrimination in the sale of goods, serv-
ices and real property to non residents. It would not be excessively 
burdensome to impose on private market operators the obligation not 
to depart from their normal terms and conditions of sale in the case 
of non-nationals or non-residents, unless such departure represented 
normal market behaviour. A possible example of discriminatory serv-
ice provision contrary to the general principle of equality is that of 
excessive ‘roaming’ charges, which have been recently regulated by 
Regulation (EC) No 717/2007. A key question which arises in this 
context is the extent to which a market operator can, or should be able 
to be, justify discrimination against out of state operators, or discrimi-
nation against customers solely because they have crossed a national 
frontier, on grounds of normal market behaviour, when market condi-
tions are not normal, and the market is not fully competitive.
Viking
The factual framework
Advocate General Maduro described the situation that gave rise to 
the Viking case1 ‘in a nutshell’ as follows:
A Finnish operator of ferry services between Helsinki and Tallin 
wished to change its place of establishment to Estonia in order to 
benefi t from lower wage levels and provide its services from there. 
A Finnish trade union, supported by an international association 
of trade unions, sought to prevent this from happening and threat-
ened strike action and boycotts if the company were to move without 
maintaining its current wage levels. The legal problems raised by 
this stand-off touch on the horizontal effect of the Treaty provisions 
1 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Judgment of 11 December 2007 (hereafter Viking).
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on freedom of movement, and on the relationship between social 
rights and the rights to freedom of movement.2
Viking, a Finnish company, operated the Rosella, which, under the 
Finnish fl ag, sailed the route between Tallinn (Estonia) and Helsinki (Fin-
land). So long as the Rosella was under the Finnish fl ag, Viking was 
obliged to under Finnish law and the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement to pay the crew wages at the same level as those applicable 
in Finland. The Rosella was running at a loss as a result from competi-
tion from Estonian vessels operating on the same route with lower wage 
costs. As an alternative to selling the vessel, Viking sought to re-fl ag it by 
registering it in Estonia. 
The Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) refused to agree to a renewal 
of the current manning agreement unless two conditions were satisfi ed. 
The fi rst was that, even after re-fl agging, Viking undertook to continue to 
follow Finnish law, and to follow relevant collective agreements relating 
to the Rosella. The second was that the change of fl ag would not lead to 
changes in the terms and conditions of employment of employees without 
their consent, and that it would not lead to any laying-off of employees 
in any Finnish fl ag vessel belonging to Viking. The FSU undertook strike 
action in support of its position.
According to the referring court, FSU was fully aware of the fact that its 
principal demand, that in the event of re-fl agging the crew would continue 
to be employed on the conditions laid down by Finnish law and the applica-
ble collective agreement, would render re-fl agging pointless, since the whole 
purpose of such refl agging was to enable Viking to reduce its wage costs.
The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) pursued a 
policy called the ‘Flag of Convenience’ (FOC) policy. The ITF considered 
that a vessel sailed under a fl ag of convenience where the benefi cial own-
ership and control of the vessel was found to lie in a State other than the 
State of the fl ag. The ITF considered that only unions established in the 
State of benefi cial ownership of a vessel had the right to conclude collec-
tive agreements covering the vessel concerned. The FOC policy was en-
forced by boycotts and other solidarity actions amongst workers. The ITF 
sent a circular to affi liated unions asking them to refrain from entering 
into negotiations with Viking. 
The course of the legal proceedings
Viking brought an action before the High Court in London3 request-
ing it to declare that the action taken by ITF and FSU was contrary to 
2  Viking, Advocate General’s Opinion para 1.
3  The secretariat of the ITF is located in London.
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Article 43 EC, to order the withdrawal of the ITF circular, and to order 
FSU not to infringe the rights which Viking enjoys under Community law. 
That Court granted the form of order sought by Viking, on the grounds 
that the actual and threatened collective action by the ITF and FSU im-
posed restrictions on the freedom of establishment, contrary to Article 43 
EC and, in the alternative, constituted unlawful restrictions on freedom 
of movement for workers and freedom to provide services under Articles 
39 and 49 EC.
ITF and FSU appealed against that decision to the referring court, 
the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) (Civil Division). The latter court 
referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice under Article 234 
EC, concerning the scope of relevant free movement provisions, their hor-
izontal effect, the existence of restrictions on free movement, and possible 
justifi cations for any such restrictions. 
Summary of the judgment of the Court of Justice
The Court held that a private undertaking could rely on Article 43 
EC against private bodies such as FSU and ITF, where they took collec-
tive action which restricted the right of establishment of the undertaking 
concerned. The Court also held that that bodies such as FSU and ITF 
could justify such collective action on grounds of overriding reasons of 
public interest, in particular the protection of workers, providing that the 
jobs or conditions of employment at issue were jeopardised or under seri-
ous threat, and providing that the collective action in issue was suitable 
for achievement of the objective pursued and did not go beyond what was 
necessary to attain that objective.
The scope of the present article
The present article is concerned with the horizontal effect of the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of movement, and with consequential im-
plications for Community competence, rather than on the relationship 
between social rights and the rights to freedom of movement. The Court’s 
judgment in Viking provokes refl ection on the legal principles underpin-
ning the Court’s conclusions as regards such horizontal effect. The Laval 
judgment4 is of signifi cance in this respect only to the extent that it con-
fi rms in similar terms and on the same basis the horizontal direct effect 
of Article 49 EC. For the purposes of the present article, consideration 
can be largely confi ned to the Viking judgment. The Court’s judgment in 
Mangold, upholding as it does the horizontal effect of the general prin-
4  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others, 
judgment of 18 December 2007 (hereafter Laval).
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ciple of equality, is relevant in this context since it may reinforce and 
extend the horizontal effects of the fundamental freedoms.5 It may also 
to a corresponding extent increase Community regulatory competence. It 
will be recalled that in Mangold the Court of Justice held inter alia that 
the general principle of equality (in casu non discrimination on grounds 
of age) was capable of having horizontal effect within the scope of Com-
munity law.
The Court’s analysis in Viking of the legal basis for the horizontal 
effect of Article 43 EC6
The Court in Viking holds that Article 43 EC is capable of conferring 
rights on a private undertaking which may be relied upon against a trade 
union or an association of trade unions. The reasons for this conclusion 
are based on propositions drawn from the Court’s previous case law.
The fi rst proposition relied upon by the Court is that the abolition of 
obstacles to freedom of movement and freedom to provide services would 
be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by 
obstacles resulting from the exercise, by associations or organisations 
not governed by public law, of their legal autonomy.7 The present writer 
would note that this proposition is as much a policy consideration as a 
legal argument. In the cases cited by the Court, it is a proposition which 
has generally been cited in conjunction with other considerations, such 
as the fact that Articles 39 EC and 49 EC do not draw any distinction as 
to the source of the restrictions on free movement which are to abolished 
or prohibited.8 A further consideration cited in this context, and in the 
case law cited by the Court in Viking, is that working conditions in the 
different Member States are sometimes governed by law or regulation, 
and sometimes by agreements and other acts adopted by private persons; 
if the scope of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC were confi ned to acts of a public 
authority there would be a risk of creating inequality in its application.9 
This consideration too is a policy consideration, but it is one which hints 
that the fact that Articles 39 EC and 49 EC do not draw any distinction 
5  Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981.
6  The Court in Laval draws a similar conclusion as regards the horizontal effect of art 49 
EC.
7  Viking para 57, citing  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405  para 18; Case 
C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 para 83; Case C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549 
para 47; Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139 para 32; and Case C-309/99 Wouters 
and Others [2002] ECR I-1577 para 120.
8  Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139 para 30; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch 
[1974] ECR 1405 para 20.
9  Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 para 84; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch 
[1974] ECR 1405 para 19.
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as to the source of the restrictions to which they refer, might refl ect the 
intent of the draftsman to avoid such inequality. 
Further propositions relied upon by the Court for the horizontal ef-
fect of Article 43 EC are based on the judgment of the Court in Defrenne 
v Sabena.10 In the latter case the Court holds that the fact that certain 
provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States, 
does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any 
individual who has an interest in compliance with the obligations thus 
laid down.11 The Court adds that the prohibition on prejudicing a funda-
mental freedom laid down in a provision of the Treaty that is mandatory 
in nature, applies in particular to all agreements intended to regulate 
paid labour collectively.12 The Court concluded that such considerations 
‘must also apply to Article 43 EC which lays down a fundamental free-
dom,’13 and added that, in the present case, the collective action taken 
was aimed ‘at the conclusion of a collective agreement, which is meant to 
regulate the work of Viking’s employees collectively.’14 
The Court’s selective citation from the reasoning in Defrenne v Sabe-
na is worthy of remark. In particular, the Court does not refer to the 
paragraphs in the Defrenne judgment which hold that the reference in 
Article 141 EC to ‘Member States’ ensuring and maintaining application 
of the principle of equal pay is a reference to the judicial authorities of 
Member States as well as their legislative authorities.15 That is an argu-
ment which is capable of being advanced in favour of the horizontal ap-
plication of Treaty provisions, as Advocate General Maduro points out.16 
A further proposition relied upon by the Court is that restrictions 
on the free movement of goods may result from action of individuals or 
groups of individuals rather than being caused by the State.17 This as-
pect of the Court’s reasoning is something of a new departure, given the 
context. The Court refers to its judgments in Commission v France,18 and 
Schmidberger.19 It will be recalled that the fi rst case raised the question 
whether failure by the French authorities to prevent acts of physical ob-
struction, damage to property, and violence directed, inter alia, at vehi-
10  Viking para 58, citing Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455.
11  Defrenne v Sabena para 31.
12  Defrenne v Sabena para 39.
13  Viking para 59.
14  Viking para 60.
15  Defrenne v Sabena paras 35 to 37.
16  Opinion of Advocate General Maduro para 40.
17  Viking para 62.
18  Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959.
19  Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
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cles transporting imports into France, amounted to an infringement by 
France of Article 28 EC. The second case raised the question whether fail-
ure of the Austrian national authorities to prevent a demonstration lead-
ing to the complete closure of a major transit route for almost 30 hours 
amounted to an infringement of Article 28 EC by Austria. The Court cites 
paragraph 30 of its judgment in Commission v France, which reads as 
follows:
As an indispensable instrument for the realization of a market with-
out internal frontiers, Article [28] therefore does not prohibit solely 
measures emanating from the State which, in themselves, create 
restrictions on trade between Member States. It also applies where 
a Member State abstains from adopting the measures required in 
order to deal with obstacles to a free movement of goods which are 
not caused by the State.20
The Court in Viking also cites two paragraphs from its judgment in 
Schmidberger. The fi rst simply repeats the gist of the above paragraph from 
the judgment in Commission v France. The second paragraph reads:
It follows that, in a situation such as that in issue in the main pro-
ceedings, where the competent national authorities are faced with 
restrictions on the effective exercise of a fundamental freedom en-
shrined in the Treaty, such as the free movement of goods, which 
result from actions taken by individuals, they are required to take 
adequate steps to ensure that freedom in the Member State con-
cerned even if, as in the main proceedings, those goods merely pass 
through Austria en route for Italy or Germany.21
These statements of the Court are clearly concerned with the duty 
of a Member State, pursuant to Article 28 EC, to take action to prevent 
individuals obstructing the transit of goods through a Member State. Yet 
in Viking the Court cites these statements as supporting the conclusion 
that Article 43 EC must be interpreted as meaning that it may in ap-
propriate circumstances be relied upon by a private undertaking in a 
direct action against a trade union or an association of trade unions.22 
Advocate General Maduro too thought that the signifi cance of the above 
cases was not confi ned to actions against a Member State for inaction.23 
He considered that ‘…constitutional rules that are addressed to the State 
translate into legal rules applying between private parties…’24 In this con-
text he referred to the ruling in Defrenne, in which the Court ‘construed 
20  Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959 para 30.
21  Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 para 62.
22  Viking para 61.
23  Opinion paras 38 to 40.
24  Opinion para 39.
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the horizontal effect of that provision as a duty on the national courts.’25 
There is no express indication in the Court’s judgment that it endorses 
the broad proposition advanced by Advocate General Maduro, but the 
Court certainly considered that case law on the duty of Member States 
to prevent individuals from interfering with the free movement of goods 
was material to the question of the horizontal effect of Article 43 EC. The 
present writer agrees that such a link exists, but considers that it may be 
a more specifi c link with narrower implications than suggested by Advo-
cate General Maduro.
It is signifi cant that the Court rejects - fairly emphatically - the argu-
ment that horizontal direct effect can apply only ‘to quasi-public organi-
sations, or to associations exercising a regulatory task and having quasi-
legislative powers.’26 The Court states that there is no indication in its 
case law that could validly support the view that it applies only to such 
organisations.27 Yet the Court adds that, ‘in exercising their autonomous 
power…trade unions participate in the drawing up of agreements seek-
ing to regulate paid work collectively.’ The Court appears to be saying 
two things about ‘regulation’. The second point about regulation is that 
trade unions participate in the collective regulation of paid work. This is 
presumably legally signifi cant or the Court would not emphasise it. The 
present writer considers that it is legally signifi cant, because regulatory 
action by the State is action subject to the fundamental freedoms, and if 
action is taken by private parties which can be regarded as analogous to 
State regulatory action, there is logic in treating such private action as 
similarly constrained by the fundamental freedoms. Yet the Court clearly 
does not wish to confi ne the regulatory action of private parties caught by 
the fundamental freedoms to regulatory action engaged in by regulators 
in a formal sense, such as international sporting associations,28 or pro-
fessional bodies.29 This is consistent with the Court’s reference to restric-
tions on the free movement of goods resulting from action by individu-
als or groups of individuals; in the cases in question the individuals or 
groups concerned temporarily regulated transit on the highway, though 
they clearly were not regulators in any formal sense. It is also consistent 
with recognising that, for example, the corporate constitution may be re-
garded as regulating the conditions of access to the market in shares of a 
company, for the purposes of the horizontal application of Article 43 EC. 
This point is addressed further below.
25  Opinion para 40.
26  Viking para 64, and the point is repeated in para 65.
27  Viking para 65.
28  See eg Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 para 87.
29  Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577 para 120.
9CYELP 4 [2008] 1-48
Finally, the Court fi nds that collective action such as that in issue in 
Viking has the effect of making less attractive, or even pointless, Viking’s 
exercise of the right to freedom of establishment. It followed that collec-
tive action such as that in issue in the national proceedings amounted to 
a restriction on freedom of establishment.30
It is appropriate to refer at this point to the link between the scope 
of fundamental freedoms, and the scope of Community regulatory com-
petence, and to an argument rejected by the Court both in Viking and 
in Laval. The argument was to the effect that, since Article 137(5) EC 
exclude from the scope of Article 137 ‘pay, the right of association, the 
right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs’, such matters were also 
excluded from the scope of Article 43 EC and Article 49 EC. The Court 
rejected this argument on the basis that the fact that such matters re-
mained in principle within national competence did not release Member 
States from the obligation to exercise that competence consistently with 
Community law.31 The argument that Article 137(5) EC militated against 
the application of Articles 43 and 49 EC to collective action perhaps re-
ceived less attention than it deserved. The effect of holding that collective 
action including strike action falls within the scope of Article 43 EC and 
Article 49 EC would seem to have the consequence that such action also 
falls within the regulatory competence of the Community institutions 
pursuant to Article 47(2) EC (applicable to services by virtue of Article 
55 EC).32 It is a somewhat curious position that strike action is excluded 
entirely from the scope of Article 137, and that pursuant to that Article, 
Community measures concerning ‘collective defence of the interests of 
workers…’  are subject to unanimity in Council, and to mere consultation 
with the European Parliament,33 while Community legislation based on 
Article 47(2) EC can apparently harmonise national rules covering both 
the collective defence of the interests of workers, and strike action, under 
the Article 251 procedure.34 An argument to the effect that Article 137(5) 
EC implies that strike action does not fall within the scope of Article 43 
EC and Article 49 EC because if it did it would also fall also fall within 
the regulatory competence of the Community under Articles 47(2) EC and 
55 EC, and thereby deprive Article 137(5) EC of much of its practical ef-
30  Viking para 72.
31  Viking para 40; Laval para 87. The argument was advanced by Denmark in Viking, and 
by Denmark and Sweden in Laval.
32  It seems that strike action and the collective defence of workers’ interests concerns ‘the 
pursuit of activities as self-employed persons’ within the meaning of art 47(2) EC, since the 
Court in Viking and Laval holds that such action and collective defence of workers’ interests 
is capable of restricting the right of establishment. 
33  Art 137(2) EC.
34  Voting in Council would be by qualifi ed majority.
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fect, is at the very least a plausible argument, and it not really addressed 
by the Court. Perhaps the argument was not put to the Court in those 
terms. But the link between the scope of fundamental freedoms and the 
scope of Community competence to regulate the internal market is a sig-
nifi cant link. Extension of the horizontal scope of Treaty provisions in 
principle brings with it increased competence at the Community level to 
regulate private conduct, and that in turn narrows the area within which 
national authorities are free to regulate without the risk of being over-
ruled at Community level. 
Advocate General Maduro’s approach to horizontal direct effect in 
Viking
The judgment in Viking provokes refl ection on the legal principles 
underpinning the Court’s conclusions on this point, and on the general 
scope of the horizontal effect of the fundamental freedoms. Advocate Gen-
eral Maduro analysed the extent to which Treaty provisions on freedom 
of movement create obligations for private actors. It is not possible in the 
span of this article to do full justice to his arguments, and what follows 
is a summary of his position. He thought that ‘at the heart of the matter’ 
lay the following question:
does the Treaty imply that, in order to ensure the proper function-
ing of the common market, the provisions on freedom of movement 
protect the rights of market participants, not just by limiting the 
powers of the authorities of the Member States, but also by limiting 
the autonomy of others?35
He answered this question in the affi rmative. As noted above, he ar-
gued that the signifi cance of Commission v France and Schmidberger was 
not confi ned to actions against the State for inaction. He considered that 
constitutional rules addressed to the State translate into legal rules ap-
plying between private parties, and he cited in support of this approach 
the ruling in Defrenne, in which the Court treated the duty on Member 
States to ensure and maintain application of the principle of equal pay, 
as including a duty on national courts to bring this about.
Advocate General Maduro next asked: to what sort of private ac-
tion do the rules of freedom of movement apply? He did not think that 
the rules on freedom of movement can always be brought into play in 
proceedings against a private individual. State authorities have consid-
erably more potential to impede the proper functioning of the common 
market than private individuals.36 By way of contrast, in many circum-
35  Para 36 of his Opinion.
36  Para 41 of Opinion.
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stances private actors ‘simply do not wield enough infl uence successfully 
to prevent others from enjoying their rights to freedom of movement.’ He 
cites the example of an individual shopkeeper who refuses to purchase 
goods from other Member States as a case which would not be liable to 
obstruct the functioning of the common market. The reason given is that 
‘suppliers from other Member States would still have the opportunity to 
market their goods through alternative channels.’37  Advocate General 
Maduro comes to the conclusion that the implication is that the rules on 
freedom of movement apply directly to any private action ‘that is capable 
of effectively restricting others from exercising their right of freedom of 
movement.’38 But he accepts that there is no simple answer to the ques-
tion how to determine whether that is indeed the situation, and notes 
that the Court in its case law has proceeded carefully by recognising 
the direct horizontal application of the rules on freedom of movement in 
specifi c cases. He comes to the general conclusion that ‘the provisions on 
freedom of movement apply to private action that, by virtue of its general 
effect on the holders of rights of freedom of movement, is capable of re-
stricting them from exercising those rights, by raising an obstacle that 
they cannot reasonably circumvent.’39
Further analysis - principle and policy considerations bearing on the 
scope of the horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms
Advocate General Maduro’s analysis is certainly plausible. Since it 
does not claim to be an exhaustive analysis it is appropriate to treat 
it as a starting point and explore other considerations of principle and 
policy which bear on the question of the horizontal scope of fundamen-
tal freedoms. The present write would suggest that the following general 
considerations are relevant to determining the extent of the horizontal 
reach of the fundamental freedoms. 
In the fi rst place, fundamental freedoms guarantee to market opera-
tors the right to carry on cross-border economic activities, and to compete 
with other market operators. It would seem to follow that normal market 
behaviour designed to improve the market position or market returns of 
one economic operator should not in principle be held to amount to a re-
striction on the fundamental freedom of another market operator.
Secondly, the concept of a restriction on a fundamental freedom im-
plies action which is external to the market, or which at any rate falls 
outside the range of normal competitive market behaviour designed to 
increase market returns or improve the market position of operators vis-
37  Para 42 of Opinion.
38  Para 43 of Opinion.
39  Para 48 of Opinion.
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à-vis their competitors, or suppliers or customers. The archetypical ex-
ample of a restriction on the exercise of a fundamental freedom is regu-
lation of one sort or another of cross-border economic activity by public 
authorities of a Member State. The Court’s case law to the effect that 
collective regulation of economic action by private operators acting under 
private law may amount to a restriction on a fundamental freedom is 
convincing. If private operators assume the mantle of market regulators, 
they will in turn be subject to those Treaty rules which fi x limits on the 
regulation of cross-border economic activities.
Thirdly, discriminatory conduct by market operators, or other con-
duct which falls outside the range of normal competitive market behav-
iour, would seem capable of falling within the horizontal effect of a fun-
damental freedom, at any rate where it restricts access of other market 
operators, or consumers, to the market, or places market operators or 
consumers at a disadvantage because they have exercised a fundamental 
freedom. It should be emphasised however, that apparently discrimina-
tory conduct may be justifi ed on commercial grounds, and normal mar-
ket behaviour should not be regarded as discrimination prohibited by the 
Treaty.
Whether particular conduct of this latter type amounts to a breach 
of a fundamental freedom will depend on the aims and wording of the 
freedom in question. In assessing the potential scope of the freedom in 
question, account must be taken of two further considerations. The fi rst 
is the policy consideration of whether or not it would be excessively bur-
densome to make private market operators subject to the obligation to 
comply with the fundamental freedom in issue. The second is the impact 
upon Community legislative competence of extending application of a 
fundamental freedom to private market operators.
A related issue to be taken into account is the possible impact of the 
horizontal effect of the fundamental principle of equality, as articulated 
in the Mangold case.40 The general principle of equality includes the pro-
hibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 
12 EC,41 which provides that the latter prohibition applies within the 
scope of application of the Treaty, but without prejudice to any special 
provisions therein. The ‘special provisions’ referred to are in particular 
those other provisions of the Treaty in which the application of the gen-
eral principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is given 
concrete form in respect of specifi c situations, such as free movement of 
workers, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services.42 
40  Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981.
41  Case C-309/89 Codorniu [1994] ECR I-1853 para 26.
42  Case C-186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195 para 14. 
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The effect of the proviso as regards such special provisions is that the 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality ‘applies 
independently only to situation governed by Community law in regard to 
which the Treaty lays down no specifi c prohibition of discrimination.’43 
Since the situations falling within the scope of Community law include 
those involving the exercise of fundamental freedoms,44 with the con-
sequence that Article 12 EC may prohibit discrimination on grounds of 
nationality as regards a person exercising a fundamental freedom, yet the 
latter Article may only apply independently where the fundamental free-
dom does not itself prohibit discrimination on grounds of nationality in 
the situation in question, the effect of Article 12 EC may be to reinforce, 
or supplement, the scope of fundamental freedoms in certain situations. 
The signifi cance of this in the present context is that Mangold implies 
that Article 12 EC is capable of horizontal application, since it comprises 
an aspect of the general principle of equality, which the Court in Mangold 
treats as being of horizontal application. The implications of the Mangold 
case are controversial, however, and it merits further consideration.
The Mangold Case
The Court of Justice appears in Mangold to have endorsed a proposi-
tion which is of signifi cance to the present discussion: that the general 
principle of equality ( in casu the prohibition of age discrimination) is 
horizontally directly effective within the scope of Community law. The 
context for this ruling was the question whether a provision of Direc-
tive 2000/78 prohibiting inter alia discrimination on grounds of age in 
employment, could be applied in a dispute between an employee and his 
employer, to set aside a provision of national law inconsistent with the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age, despite the fact that at 
the relevant time the period for implementation of the Directive in ques-
tion had not expired. The Court noted that Directive 2000/78 did not 
itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the fi eld of employment 
and occupation, which was derived from international instruments and 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. It followed, 
in the Court’s view, that non-discrimination on grounds of age must be 
regarded as a general principle of Community law, applicable to national 
rules falling within the scope of Community law, and capable of disapply-
ing such rules if incompatible with the general principle in question.   
The Mangold judgment has been criticised or qualifi ed in the Opin-
ions of a number of Advocates General, in various respects, and for vari-
43  Case 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461 para 13.
44  C-184/99 Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193 para 33; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] 
ECR I-11613 para 23.
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ous reasons. Advocate General Sharpston refers to a previous Opinion 
of her own, and to the Opinions of three other Advocates General, in 
Bartsch.45 In her Opinion in Bartsch, Advocate General Sharpston notes 
academic criticism of Mangold, as follows:46
Mangold has attracted a certain amount of academic criticism. The 
general theme of the criticism is that the Court (of its own volition, 
without good reason and against the wishes of the legislature) ex-
tended the scope of a directive,47 to give it effect before the end of 
its transitional period and in horizontal circumstances, by making 
an innovative reference to a general principle of Community law.48 
Consequently, a number of commentators have expressed the opin-
ion that the Court has undermined the purpose of direct effect.49 
Furthermore, the ruling is criticised for having produced a situation 
of considerable legal uncertainty.50
In Carp, Advocate General Trstenjak argues that in Mangold the 
general principle of equality bestowed horizontal direct effect on Direc-
tive 2000/78, which prohibited discrimination based on age.51 In Othmar 
Michaeler Subito GmbH, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer argues 
for a minimalist reading, or re-reading, of Mangold, to the effect that:
45  See the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 22 May 2008, in Case C-427/06 Birgit 
Bartsch paras 33-41, referring  to (1)Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-13/05 Chacón 
Navas [2006] ECR- I 6467, (2) herself, in Case C-227/04 P Lindorfer [2007] ECR I-6767, 
(3) Advocate General Mazák in Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, and 
(4) Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-267/06 Maruko, judgment of 1 April 
2008, not yet reported.
46  Para 31 of her Opinion.
47  See, for example, J Cavallini, ‘De la suppression des restrictions à la conclusion d’un 
contrat à durée déterminée lorsque le salarié est un senior’ (2005) La Semaine Juridique 
Sociale 25-28; O Dubos, ‘La Cour de justice, le renvoi préjudiciel, l’invocabilité des direc-
tives: de l’apostasie à l’hérésie?’ (2006) La Semaine Juridique 1295-1297; O LeClerc, ‘Le 
contrat de travail des seniors à l’épreuve du droit communautaire’ (2006) Recueil Dalloz 
557-561; M Nicolella, ‘Une application anticipée des directives non transposées?’ (2006) Ga-
zette du Palais 22; E Dubout, ‘Mangold’ (2005) Revue des Affaires Européennes 723-733; A 
Masson and C Micheau, ‘The Werner Mangold Case: An Example of Legal Militancy’ (2007) 
European Public Law 587-593; Editorial Comments, CML Rev 2006, 1-8.
48  See, for example, K Riesenhuber, Case Note (2007) European Review of Contract Law 62; 
J Swift, ‘Pale, stale, male’ (2007) NLJ 532-534; Editorial Comments, CML Rev, cited above. 
This is viewed positively from a rights perspective in D Schiek, ‘The ECJ Decision in Man-
gold: A Further Twist on Effects of Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community 
Equality Legislation’ (2006) ILJ 329-341.
49  See, for example, Cavallini, Dubos, ‘Editorial Comments’ CML Rev (n 47).
50  See, for example, Swift (n 48) Cavallini, Nicolella, Dubout, Masson/Micheau (n 47); D 
Martin, ‘L’arrêt Mangold - Vers une hiérarchie inversée du droit à l’égalité en droit commu-
nautaire?’(2006) Journal des Tribunaux du Travail 109-116.
51   Case C-80/06 Carp [2007] ECR I - 4473, Opinion of Advocate General para 70.
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It would be preferable, where they are invoked in cases concern-
ing directives, if the general principles of law acted as criteria for 
interpretation. In that way, the relationship between the principles 
and directives would create a climate more likely to guarantee legal 
certainty and more in keeping with the institutional equilibrium un-
derlying a system of sources such as the Community one.52
Advocate General Sharpston addresses the question of the horizon-
tal direct effect of the principle of equality in Bartsch, and considers that 
‘one should be slow to exclude the possibility that a general principle of 
Community law may, in appropriate circumstances, be applied horizon-
tally.’ 53
In light of the criticism levelled at Mangold, it would be unwise to ac-
cept at face value the proposition that the general principle of equality is 
horizontally directly effective in all its various manifestations, and to all 
situations falling within the scope of Community law. But it might never-
theless be appropriate to rely on Mangold to support the rather narrower 
proposition that the general principle of equality, and in particular the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Arti-
cle 12 EC, is horizontally directly effective in those cases where such ef-
fect would reinforce and supplement the scope of fundamental freedoms, 
and be conducive to achieving the aims of the internal market. Walrave 
and Koch suggests that Article 12 EC is capable in principle of horizon-
tal application.54 A general argument in favour of the horizontal effect of 
Article 12 EC is that it does not draw any distinction as to the source 
- public or private - of the discrimination which is to be prohibited. In 
the case of other Treaty Articles, such as Articles 39 EC and 49 EC, the 
Court has regarded it as a factor favouring the possibility of horizontal 
effect that these provisions do not draw any distinction as to the source of 
the restrictions on free movement which are to abolished or prohibited.55 
The present writer considers that recognising the horizontal direct effect 
of Article 12 in certain situations involving the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms, in particular as regards discrimination on grounds of nation-
ality in the supply of goods, services, business premises and housing, 
would reinforce fundamental freedoms and be conducive to achieving the 
aims of the internal market, without placing excessive burdens on pri-
vate operators. The present writer would make the same point as regards 
52  Joined Cases C-55/07 and C-56/07 Othmar Michaeler Subito GmbH Judgment of the 
Court of 24 April 2008, Opinion of the Advocate General para 22.
53   Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 22 May 2008, in Case C-427/06 Birgit Bar-
tsch paras 79-85.
54  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 paras 16, 17 and 25.
55  Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I - 4139 para 30; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch 
[1974] ECR 1405  para 20.
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discrimination by private operators against non resident customers. It 
is to be noted that discrimination against non-residents may amount to 
indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality, and also comprises dis-
crimination which falls within the scope of fundamental freedoms, viz., 
the freedom to provide services, and the free movement of goods.56 Ac-
cording horizontal effect to discrimination on grounds of residence would 
thus reinforce the effect of fundamental freedoms and be conducive to 
achieving the aims of the internal market. But in considering the scope of 
the duties of non discrimination referred to, account should still be taken 
of the general considerations referred to above, and in particular of the 
consideration that normal market behaviour should not be regarded as 
comprising discrimination prohibited by the Treaty.
Refl ections on the approach adopted in Viking to collective action 
by trade union bodies as a restriction on freedom of establishment
The approach adopted by the Court in Viking to the question of the 
horizontal direct effect of Article 43 EC is based on its previous case law. 
While the Court denies that the principle to be derived from the cases on 
‘collective regulation’ is limited to cases of organisation exercising a regu-
latory task or having quasi-legislative powers, the Court notes that ‘trade 
unions participate in the drawing up of agreements seeking to regulate 
paid work collectively.’57  This is a plausible basis for holding that Article 
43 EC may apply to the terms of collective agreements, and to collective 
action by trade unions relating to terms and conditions of employment, 
for the reasons given above - in particular, if private operators assume 
the mantle of market regulators, they will be subject to those Treaty rules 
which fi x limits on the regulation of cross-border economic activities. 
That being the case, since the collective action in question was found by 
the Court to restrict the right of establishment of Viking, it was necessary 
to consider the issues of justifi cation, and the proportionality of the col-
lective action in issue.
As regards justifi cation, the Court held that that bodies such as FSU 
and ITF could justify such collective action on grounds of overriding rea-
sons of public interest, in particular the protection of workers, providing 
that the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were jeopardised or 
under serious threat, and providing that the collective action in issue was 
suitable for achievement of the objective pursued and did not go beyond 
what was necessary to attain that objective. In this regard, the Court im-
56  It is noted below that the right of individuals to cross national frontiers for the purpose 
of shopping falls within the scope of the free movement of goods, see Case C-362/88 GB-
INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667 para 8.
57  Viking para 65.
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plies that collective action could not be justifi ed in order to prevent the 
progressive replacement of seamen covered by the original Finnish agree-
ment by seamen employed under Estonian law, or under any subsequent 
agreement negotiated under Estonian law.58 Lawful collective action by 
the union would seem to be confi ned to protecting the terms and condi-
tions of employment, and jobs of its members, and such action could not 
lawfully extend to regulating the terms and conditions of employment of 
future employees.59 
It is argued above that the normal market behaviour of one mar-
ket operator cannot in principle in itself amount to a restriction on the 
fundamental freedom of another market operator. Should this lead to 
the conclusion that collective action by trade unions in pursuit of the 
interests of their members is not in principle caught by Article 43 EC 
since it simply amounts to negotiation by or on behalf of market opera-
tors (workers) to improve their market position? It might be objected that 
collective action is a cartelised means of improving the market position 
of workers, and that it involves resort to pressures external to the play 
of market forces, such as boycotts, which the ITF used in pursuance of 
their FOC policy. But for certain purposes at least, it seems that collec-
tive action by trade unions is to be regarded as normal market behaviour. 
Thus in Albany the Court of Justice held that certain restrictions of com-
petition are inherent in collective agreements, but that the social policy 
objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined 
if management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) of the Treaty 
when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work 
and employment.60 In the Viking case, FSU and ITF argued that Albany 
should be applied by analogy to the case in the main proceedings, since 
certain restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services were inherent in collective action taken in the context of collec-
tive negotiations. The Court rejected this argument, denying that it could 
be considered to be inherent in the very exercise of trade union rights 
and the right to take collective action that fundamental freedoms will be 
prejudiced to a certain degree.61 
58  Viking paras 81 and 82.
59  This view seems to be shared by ACL Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The 
Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) ILJ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 
12/2008.
60  Case 67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie 
[1999] ECR I-5751 para 59.
61  Viking para 52. The Court also reasons that the fact that an agreement or activity is 
excluded from the scope of the provisions of the Treaty on competition does not mean that 
that agreement or activity also falls outside the scope of the Treaty provisions on free move-
ment of persons or services, since those two sets of provisions are to be applied in different 
sets of circumstances (Viking para 53). The Court adds that it has already held that the 
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This latter aspect of the Court’s reasoning is not entirely convincing. 
It is surely inherent in the legal recognition of the right to take collective 
action that managerial decisions will be prejudiced to a certain degree, 
and it would be curious indeed if managerial decisions involving cross-
border activity were wholly immune from such prejudice. But even if it 
is accepted that collective action should be treated as normal market 
behaviour for workers and those who represent their interests, and ac-
cordingly as not per se a restriction on the right of establishment of an 
employer, this argument could only be maintained to the extent that the 
collective action in question promotes and protects the working condi-
tions of current members of the union concerned. To the extent that 
collective action seeks to determine such matters as, for example, the 
Member State in which a vessel is to be registered, or the terms and con-
ditions applicable to future employees who are not its members and may 
never be its members, the action would seem to amount to regulation 
of the market, and at that point Article 43 EC should be applicable. On 
this view, admittedly, it would still in principle be possible to justify the 
collective action in question on grounds of overriding reasons of public 
interest, provided that the action were appropriate and proportionate. 
But in the case in point, the aim of the collective action was to render 
the re-fl agging of the vessel in question pointless, and thereby to deprive 
Viking’s exercise of the right of establishment of all practical effect. Even 
if the action of the FSU and ITF were regarded as falling within the scope 
of Article 43 EC only at the point at which it went beyond furtherance 
of the interests of employees represented by those bodies, justifi cation 
of the action in issue in terms of proportionality would seem to be prob-
lematic.
On the facts of Viking, both these arguments, that is to say, that ac-
cepted by the Court of Justice, and that advanced hypothetically by the 
present writer, would seem to lead to the same outcome, which is to the 
effect that collective action by the trade union bodies concerned are con-
sistent with Community law to the extent that they are strictly related to 
maintaining the market position of their present members; if the collec-
tive action goes further than that, it amounts to regulation of the market 
contrary to Article 43 EC which cannot be justifi ed by the protection of 
the interests of trade union members.
terms of collective agreements are not excluded from the scope of the Treaty provisions on 
freedom of movement for persons (Viking para 54).
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The horizontal scope of Article 28 EC
Article 28 EC applies to State measures and private action analogous 
to State action
The text of Article 28 EC62 suggests that its aim is to prohibit State 
measures which impose quantitative restrictions, or measures having 
equivalent effect, on trade between Member States. This inference is sup-
ported by the text of the formerly applicable standstill provision, which 
stated that ‘Member States shall refrain from introducing between them-
selves any new quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent 
effect’ (Article 31 EC prior to the Amsterdam amendments) (emphasis 
added). The Court has said that the concept of a quantitative restric-
tion ‘covers measures which amount to a partial or total restraint of, 
according to the circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit.’63 
Measures having equivalent effect ‘not only take the form of restraint de-
scribed; whatever the description or technique employed, they can also 
consist of encumbrances having the same effect.’64 In order for measures 
to amount to such ‘restraints’ or ‘encumbrances’ it would seem necessary 
for them to interpose themselves in some way between potential purchas-
ers of imported goods and potential sellers of those goods. 
In Commission v France,65 and Schmidberger,66 the private action in 
issue had the aim and effect of preventing normal transit on the highway. 
The action thus interposed itself between potential purchasers and po-
tential sellers of the goods in a manner analogous to regulatory action of 
the State. The private action in question displaced, however temporarily, 
the prerogatives of the state to regulate transit on the highway. The Court 
implies in Viking that such action is subject directly to the application of 
Article 28 EC.  It may be that Article 28 EC applies horizontally solely to 
that private action which seeks to regulate trade or the transit of goods, 
in a way analogous to the ways in which State authorities regulate trade 
or the transit of goods. The form of such regulation, however, need not in 
principle amount to physical interference with the transit of goods. 
The effect of applying Article 28 EC to private action restricting the 
free movement of goods is that such action in turn becomes, in principle, 
subject to the competence of the Community institutions to regulate the 
internal market, subject to restraints on such regulation resulting from 
62  ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States.’
63  Case 2/73 Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865 para 7.
64  Case 2/73 Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865 para 7.
65  Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959.
66  Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
20 Derrick Wyatt: Horizontal Effect of Fundamenal Freedoms and the Right to Eequality...
the general principles of law, including fundamental rights. One outcome 
of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Commission v France was the 
adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/9 on the functioning of 
the internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the 
Member States, based on Article 308 EC.67 The Regulation provides inter 
alia that where serious disruption to the free movement of goods occurs 
in a Member State, the Member State concerned shall take all necessary 
and proportionate measures so that the free movement of goods is as-
sured in the territory of the Member State in accordance with the Trea-
ty.68 The Regulation may not however be interpreted as affecting in any 
way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, 
including the right or freedom to strike, or exercise any other right or 
freedom bestowed by the specifi c industrial relations systems in Member 
States.69 It does not follow, however, that regulation of the right to strike 
and other collective action fall outside the scope of Community regulatory 
competence. In Viking and Laval, the Court balances the fundamental 
right to strike against the fundamental economic freedom to carry on 
business across national frontiers, and in so doing defi nes the limits of 
each right and freedom in the context in question. If the Court of Justice 
is competent to undertake this balancing exercise in the exercise of its 
judicial competence, then the Commission, Council and Parliament are 
in principle competent to undertake a similar exercise in the exercise of 
their legislative functions. In the context of the free movement of goods, 
the only available Treaty base for regulation of collective action of workers 
would seem to be Article 308 EC, since Article 95 (2) EC excludes from 
the scope of Article 95(1) EC provisions ‘relating to the rights and inter-
ests of employed persons.’
Article 28 EC is applicable to purchasing choices by State 
authorities
There is no indication in Article 28 EC that it aims to regulate pur-
chasing choices. Indeed, in a consistent case law, the Court of Justice 
has described measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restric-
tions as all ‘trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade’ (emphasis added).70 The Court has also described Article 28 EC as 
67  [1998] OJ L 337/8.
68  Art 4 and art 1.
69  Art 2.
70  Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 836 paras 5-8. The Court continues to reiterate this 
formulation, see, for example, Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides 
Media AG judgment of 14 February 2008 para 26. 
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applying to the marketing of products.71 These formulations used by the 
Court in describing the measures covered by Article 28 do not suggest 
that purchasing choices which favour domestic products would amount 
to measures covered by Article 28 EC. It would seem to follow that if, e.g., 
individual consumers admit to making discriminatory choices by favour-
ing domestic products, their conduct would not fall within the scope of 
Article 28 EC. Moreover, from a policy point of view it would be exces-
sively intrusive and burdensome to hold purchasing decisions by private 
individuals to be subject to Article 28 EC.
On the other hand, it is established that Article 28 EC does apply to 
the purchasing choices of public authorities.72 It is also established that 
recommendations by or on behalf of the State to purchase products of 
local origin fall within the scope of Article 28.73 Advertising campaigns 
by producers encouraging consumers to buy their products constitute 
normal market behaviour designed to improve the position of those con-
cerned on the market, and do not fall within the scope of Article 28 EC.74 
The present writer considers that the same is true of advertising cam-
paigns by producers encouraging consumers to buy goods of local rather 
than foreign origin.
Purchasing choices made by State authorities are intrinsically sus-
ceptible to being infl uenced by the policy consideration of giving prefer-
ence to national products, and may for that reason be equated to meas-
ures which regulate trade in goods. The Court of Justice has indicated 
that the aim of Community rules on procurement by public bodies is 
to avoid the risk of preference being given to national tenderers and to 
avoid the possibility that public bodies may choose to be guided by con-
siderations other than economic ones.75 If public bodies recommended 
71  Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279 para 55.
72  See Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement  (2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 
2005) 183-186.
73  Recommendations by public authorities encouraging preference for domestic products 
falls within the scope of art 2(3)(k) of Directive 70/50/EEC; see Case 249/81 Commission 
v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005; Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council [1983] ECR 
4083.
74  In Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005, the Court refers to the ‘buy 
Irish’ campaign sponsored by the Irish government and states, at para 23, that ‘the fi rst 
observation to be made is that the campaign cannot be likened to advertising by private 
or public undertakings, or by a group of undertakings, to encourage people to buy goods 
produced by those undertakings…’. In Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council 
[1983] ECR 4083, the Court states at para 17 that ‘in fact , a body such as the Development 
Council, which is set up by the Government of a Member State and is fi nanced by a charge 
imposed on growers, cannot under Community law enjoy the same freedom as regards the 
methods of advertising used as that enjoyed by producers themselves or producers’ associa-
tions of a voluntary character.’
75  Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau AG [2002] ECR I-11617 para 52.
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or imposed such preferences on private market operators or consumers, 
such recommendations or requirements would amount to trading rules 
affecting the marketing of products. Where public bodies choose to be 
guided by considerations other than economic ones, such as national 
preference, the effect is as much regulation of the market as would be 
the imposition of such preferences on private market operators or con-
sumers. In such circumstances what appears to be a purchasing choice 
in fact has a dual character. The purchasing choice is combined with a 
regulatory choice on the part of the State. It is the regulatory choice by 
the State which amounts to a measure having equivalent effect to a quan-
titative restriction within the meaning of Article 28 EC.
Article 28 EC should not be regarded as applicable to purchasing 
choices by private market operators
Individual purchasing choices by private operators cannot be equat-
ed with purchasing choices by public authorities. If a private market op-
erator (such as a supermarket) chooses to discriminate against imports 
in order to favour local produce and local employment, that choice is 
not subject to the regulatory constraint characteristic of a quantitative 
restriction or a measure having equivalent effect. In any event, it may be 
commercially rational for a market operator to take into account ostensi-
bly non market considerations when exercising purchasing options, since 
such non market considerations may infl uence the purchasing choices of 
customers of the market operator. Thus, the supermarket giving prefer-
ence to local produce may improve its market position with consumers 
who wish, for a variety of reasons (e.g., environmental reasons, protect-
ing local jobs), to purchase local produce. Disentangling market and non 
market considerations could be diffi cult in such circumstances.
It seems that, in principle, discriminatory purchasing choices by a 
private market operator should fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC, 
even if the private operator holds a signifi cant market position. Advocate 
General Maduro seems to distinguish between discrimination by private 
market operators holding insignifi cant market positions (he gives the ex-
ample of an individual shopkeeper), and discrimination by private market 
operators holding signifi cant market positions. This is a possible solu-
tion, but the present writer is not convinced it is correct. In the absence 
of collective action, which could be regarded as aiming to regulate the 
market, discriminatory purchasing decisions by private market operators 
would not seem to fall within the scope of Article 28 EC. 
There are policy reasons for supporting this conclusion. Placing 
private market operators at risk of legal action by potential vendors of 
imported goods would place excessive burdens on potential purchasers 
of such products. Reference has already been made to the diffi culty of 
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disentangling market considerations from non market considerations in 
this context. Even though they would be free to justify decisions favour-
ing domestic products on commercial grounds, the risk of being forced 
to do so in the course of litigation could force purchasers into ‘defensive 
purchasing’ practices, which could lead in practice to adherence to the 
transparency obligations incumbent on State purchasing bodies. The 
duty of transparency arises when State bodies wish to place a contract 
of suffi cient signifi cance to be of interest to out of State operators. The 
duty of transparency results from the duty on such State bodies not to 
discriminate indirectly against out of state operators in the award of con-
tracts, and requires such bodies to publish a suffi ciently accessible ad-
vertisement prior to the award of a contract, in order to open the contract 
award to competition and allow the impartiality of procurement remedies 
to be reviewed.76 If private market operators were obliged not to discrimi-
nate in their purchasing choices against imports, they would seem to be 
bound by the same transparency obligations as State purchasing bodies, 
leaving aside any question of ‘defensive purchasing’ referred to above.
Imposing a duty on private market operators not to discriminate 
in purchasing choices would extend Community legislative competence 
signifi cantly. It would follow that the Community institutions could lay 
down rules to be followed by private market operators when making pur-
chasing choices, analogous to those laid down by Community rules for 
State authorities, and State fi nanced and controlled authorities. Since 
the present writer considers that Community competence to regulate the 
internal market should be subject to reasonable limitations, the latter 
consideration is regarded as arguing against horizontal application of Ar-
ticle 28 EC in the present context. The foregoing considerations support 
the conclusion that even private market operators holding signifi cant po-
sitions on the market should not be bound by the horizontal application 
of Article 28 EC when they make purchasing choices. 
It might be said that the position would be different if a private op-
erator chose to undertake a competitive procurement exercise by inviting 
certain operators to express interest in a contract, or by advertising a 
contract specifi cation and inviting bids. It might be said that this would 
amount to a suffi cient regulation of the market to attract the application 
of Article 28 EC, so that direct or indirect discrimination against imports 
would and should be prohibited. The present writer does not consider 
that steps taken to solicit expressions of interest or bids from potential 
76  Case C-324/98 Teleaustria [2000] ECR I-10745 para 62; Case C-231/03 Coname [2005] 
ECR I-7287 paras 16 to 19; Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen, [2005] ECR I-8585 para 49; 
and see Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to 
contract awards not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives 
[2006] OJ C 179/2.
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suppliers amounts in itself to regulation of the market for the purposes 
of the horizontal application of Article 28 EC. The ‘rules’ applied by the 
potential purchaser are not in any way extrinsic to the market, but are 
on the contrary a feature of normal market behaviour, even if the poten-
tial purchaser takes decisions within the framework of those rules which 
amount on the face of it to direct or indirect discrimination against im-
ports. Take for example a situation where a potential purchaser invites 
expressions of interest in the supply of certain components by means 
of an advertisement on a website. This provokes expressions of inter-
est from a number of potential suppliers, including some who manu-
facture the components in other Member States. Suppose the potential 
purchaser enters into negotiations solely with those market operators 
expressing interest who have in the past satisfactorily supplied the needs 
of the potential purchaser in question, and suppose those market opera-
tors all supply components produced in the same Member State as the 
potential purchaser. This latter choice has the effect of excluding imports 
from the potential purchasing decision. But it would be wrong to describe 
such discrimination in the course of the competitive tendering exercise 
as amounting to regulation of the market. And from the policy point of 
view, it would be excessively burdensome to place private operators in 
such circumstances at risk of a challenge by a potential supplier of goods 
produced in another Member State. The outcome of subsequent court 
proceedings would seem to depend on whether or not the market opera-
tor’s decision to confi ne its attention to its previous suppliers was a deci-
sion which could be on the facts be regarded as falling within the scope 
of normal market behaviour. Confi ning consideration to tried and tested 
suppliers would often be an entirely cost effective and rational way to 
proceed. The costs of requiring market operators to litigate in order to de-
fend their purchasing choices would seem to outweigh potential benefi ts. 
The present writer considers that the latter consideration argues against 
purchasing choices being subject to Article 28 EC even if a private market 
operator directly discriminates against imports by requiring suppliers to 
supply only domestically produced goods. 
Reference has already been made to the Mangold case, which estab-
lishes the horizontal effect of the general principle of equality. It might be 
argued that this principle argues in favour of making potential purchas-
ers accountable for discriminatory procurement decisions, even if they 
are private market operators. It is argued above that purchasing deci-
sions of private market operators do not fall within the scope of Article 28 
EC. There seem to be no obvious reasons for concluding that such pur-
chasing decisions nevertheless fall within the scope of Community law for 
the purposes of application of the general principle of equality. And the 
policy considerations referred to above argue against this conclusion.
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The Treaty should be applied to discriminatory sales choices by 
private market operators
The present writer would however draw the opposite conclusion as 
regards sales choices by private operators, such as shops or supermar-
kets, which discriminate on grounds of nationality, or by reference to 
the residence of potential purchasers, in the supply of goods. It would 
not seem to be excessively burdensome to impose on private operators 
the obligation not to depart from their normal terms and conditions of 
sale in the case of non nationals and non residents, unless such depar-
ture represented normal market behaviour. Whereas imposing an ob-
ligation of non discrimination on purchasers would impose a positive 
obligation to take account of the position of imports, an obligation of non 
discrimination on purchasers would amount to a negative obligation not 
to depart from normal business practice except on normal commercial 
grounds. This would be conducive to achieving the aims of the internal 
market, without imposing excessive obligations on private operators. Any 
resulting increase in Community competence would be justifi ed by these 
same considerations. This conclusion, however, is to be derived from the 
horizontal effect of the general principle of equality, in conjunction with 
Article 28 EC, rather than from Article 28 EC alone. The question of the 
imposition of duties of non discrimination on private market operators, 
such as shops and supermarkets, in the supply of goods, is considered 
further below, in conjunction with consideration of the imposition of sim-
ilar duties as regards the supply of services by private market operators 
such as hotels etc.
The horizontal scope of Article 39 EC
Walrave and Koch holds that the prohibition of discrimination in 
Article 39 EC applies not only to the action of public authorities but 
also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employ-
ment in a collective manner.77 But the horizontal scope of Article 39 EC 
is not confi ned to situations where private action regulates employment 
collectively. The latter Article, which prohibits, inter alia, discrimination 
on grounds of nationality as regards pay and conditions of employment, 
does not appear to be aimed solely at State action, nor indeed collec-
tive action by private operators, and on the face of it the Article catches 
discrimination by individual employers, whether that discrimination is 
dictated by national legislation, or private prejudice. 
77  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 paras 16, 17 and 22. See also Case C-
415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman 
[1995] ECR I-4921 paras 82 to 84.
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That is indeed the conclusion confi rmed by the Court’s case law, in 
particular in the Angonese case.78 Similar considerations apply to equal 
pay for men and women as apply to Article 39 EC. Article 141 EC requires 
Member States to ensure implementation of the principle of equal pay for 
men and women - the aim of that provision is to give rights to employees 
to receive the same pay for work of equal value irrespective of sex. On 
the face of it is this provision has the aim of placing obligations on the 
employers not to discriminate between men and women, as the Court of 
Justice held in Defrenne v Sabena.79
The horizontal scope of Article 49 EC 
Article 49 EC does not prohibit discrimination by service providers 
against service recipients
Walrave and Koch holds that the prohibition of discrimination in Ar-
ticle 49 EC applies not only to the action of public authorities but also to 
rules of any other nature aimed at regulating the provision of services in 
a collective manner.80 Article 49 EC prohibits ‘restrictions on freedom to 
provide services within the Community… in respect of nationals of Mem-
ber States who are established in a State of the Community other than 
that of the person for whom the services are intended.’ The Court of Jus-
tice has observed that Article 49 EC do not draw any distinction as to the 
source of the restrictions on free movement which are to be abolished or 
prohibited.81 Nevertheless, on the face of it, the wording of Article 49 EC 
appears to be aimed at regulatory measures (whether public or private) 
which might prevent market operators established in one Member State 
from providing services to customers established in another. Recipients 
of services might derive rights from the prohibition of restrictions on the 
freedom of providers, but only because giving rights to recipients is a 
necessary means of ensuring the rights of providers; in Luisi and Carbone 
the Court describes the right of a recipient of a service to travel to an-
other Member State as the necessary corollary of the right of the service 
provider, and fulfi ls the objective of liberalising gainful activity by way of 
provision of services.82 This analysis would suggest that discrimination 
by a service provider against a service recipient would not be covered 
by Article 49, since no restriction would be being placed on the former’s 
freedom to provide a service to the latter. 
78  Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139 para 32.
79  Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 paras 31 and 39.
80  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 paras 17, 18 and 20.
81  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 para 20.
82  Joined cases 286/82 and 26/83 Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v. Ministero del 
Tesoro. [1984] ECR 377 para 10.
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The general principle of equality in conjunction with Article 49 EC 
prohibits discrimination by service providers against recipients
However, for the reasons given above in the context of the discussion 
of Mangold, account must be taken of the general principle of equality, 
and in particular the general prohibition on discrimination on grounds 
of nationality, within the scope of application of the Treaty, laid down 
in Article 12 EC. In the Cowan case the Court of Justice endorsed the 
proposition that a tourist from one Member State visiting another Mem-
ber State was covered by Article 49 EC as a service recipient. Being thus 
in a situation covered by Community law, Article 12 required that he ‘be 
placed on a completely equal footing’ with nationals of the Member State 
in question.83 He was thus entitled to claim compensation from public 
funds for an assault which took place during his visit, on the same ba-
sis as French nationals.84 The Court in the Eberhard Haug-Adrion case 
proceeded on the basis that the prohibition of discrimination in Arti-
cle 12 EC and Article 49 EC might apply to premiums charged by an 
insurance company to its customers if the premiums discriminated on 
grounds of nationality.85  The Mangold case, referred to above, supports 
this approach, since it upholds the horizontal direct effect of the general 
principle of equality; which includes the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. 86  
The provision of services by service providers to service recipients 
resident in a different Member State falls within the scope of Community 
law. For a service provider to refuse on grounds of nationality to supply a 
service to visiting nationals of other Member States would on the face of 
it seem to be incompatible with the horizontal effect of the fundamental 
principle of equality. It would seem to follow that, for example, hotels, 
and other service providers in a Member State, which refused to deal with 
visiting nationals of other Member States, would in principle be caught 
by the horizontal effect of the general principle of equality, in conjunction 
with Article 49 EC.
It might also be the case that discrimination by hotels and other 
service providers against resident nationals of other Member States 
would be incompatible with the general principle of equality. In the Phil 
Collins case the Court held that copyright and related rights, are subject 
83  Case 186/87 Cowan v. Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195 para 10.
84  Case 186/87 Cowan v. Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195.
85  Case 251/83 Eberhard Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] ECR 4277. 
The Court pronounced the premiums to be non discriminatory since they were based on 
‘objective actuarial factors’. See para 16 of judgment.
86  Case C-309/89 Codorníu SA v Council of the European Union [1994] ECR I-1853 para 
26.
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to the general principle of non discrimination laid down by Article 12 EC, 
by virtue of their being subject to, inter alia, Articles 28 EC and Article 
49 EC, and thereby falling within the scope of operation of the Treaty, 
without there being any need to connect them in a particular case with 
the specifi c provisions of Article 28 and 49 EC.87 The analogous argu-
ment can be made that if the provision of services by service providers to 
service recipients falls within the scope of Community law in the cross 
frontier situations covered by Article 49 EC, that relationship falls within 
the scope of Community law for the purposes of Article 12 EC, without 
there being any need to connect that relationship in a particular case 
with Article 49 EC. If that argument is correct, it would indeed lead to 
the conclusion referred to above, that it would be contrary to the general 
principle of equality for hotels etc to discriminate against not only visit-
ing nationals of other Member States, but also resident nationals of other 
Member States. 
Support for this line of argument, as regards individuals if not under-
takings and companies, is to be found in the concept of EU citizenship, 
and the case law thereon. In Martinez Sala the Court held that a national 
of one Member State lawfully resident in the territory of another was 
entitled to rely on Article 12 EC to claim equality in all situations falling 
within the material scope of Community law.88 A situation fell within the 
material scope of Community law if the situation was covered by Com-
munity rules applicable to cross-border situations, even if those rules did 
not apply to the situation in issue.89 The reasoning is similar to that in 
Phil Collins, and in truth the general line of reasoning in Martinez Sala 
would not seem to be dependent upon the concept of EU Citizenship.
The general principle of equality in conjunction with Article 28 EC 
prohibits discrimination by shops, supermarkets etc.
A similar argument could be made if shops or supermarkets engaged 
in such discrimination as regards the supply of goods. The Court’s case 
law establishes that residents of one Member State visiting the territory 
of another to purchase goods fall within the scope of Article 28 EC and 
are entitled in principle to the shop under the same conditions as the lo-
cal population. As the Court says in GB-INNO-BM:
87  Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins [1993] ECR I-5145 paras 21 to 28.
88  Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691.
89  Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691 paras 26 to 28. For a convincing 
criticism of, inter alia, the Court’s approach to the “material scope” of Community law, see 
Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing the wood despite the trees? On the scope of Union Citizenship 
and its constitutional effects,’ (2008) 45 CML Rev. 13-45.
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Free movement of goods concerns not only traders but also indi-
viduals. It requires, particularly in frontier areas, that consumers 
resident in one Member State may travel freely to the territory of 
another Member State to shop under the same conditions as the lo-
cal population.90 
It would seem to follow that it would be contrary to the general prin-
ciple of equality, and in particular Article 12 EC, for shops or supermar-
kets to discriminate against visiting nationals of other Member States or 
resident nationals of other Member States. 
The position is analogous for discrimination on racial grounds in 
the supply of goods or services to the public
It is to be noted that if the foregoing arguments are correct, the result 
would be to align legal protection against discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, with that accorded against discrimination on grounds of ra-
cial or ethnic origin under Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Article 3(1)(h) 
of which (in conjunction with Articles 1 and 2) prohibits discrimination 
inter alia as regards ‘access to and supply of goods and services which 
are  available to the public…’. Article 3(1) of the Directive makes it clear 
that it applies to the supply of goods and services by both the public and 
private sectors. The fact that private operators are prohibited from dis-
criminating against potential customers on grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin suggests that it would not be excessively burdensome to accord 
similar protection to non-nationals, or indeed, non-residents.
Justifying discrimination by service providers against non resident 
recipients
It is appropriate to give further consideration to the position of a 
service provider discriminating against a recipient resident in another 
Member State. If it is the case that such discrimination is contrary to 
the general principle of equality, in conjunction with Article 49 EC, then 
the horizontal effect of these provisions would seem to apply to service 
providers refusing to provide services to customers on the ground that 
they are resident in a different Member State, and to service providers 
providing services to such customers on discriminatory terms. It will be 
noted that the Eberhard Haug-Adrion case, referred to above, concerned 
the latter situation, viz., an insurance company in Germany allegedly dis-
criminating against a customer resident in Belgium. In each of the cases 
referred to - refusal to provide a service, or provision but on discrimina-
tory terms, questions of justifi cation could arise. The Court of Justice 
90  Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667 para 8.
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held in Ciola that national rules which discriminate by reference to the 
place of residence of the recipient of services can be justifi ed only by an 
express derogation such as Article 46 EC.91 It will be recalled that the lat-
ter Article provides for derogations from the freedom to provide services 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. In Bosman92 
the Court of Justice, referring to the application of Article 43 EC to the 
rules of sporting associations, held that individuals could rely on justi-
fi cations on grounds of public policy, public security or public health; 
neither the scope nor the content of those grounds of justifi cation was in 
any way affected by the public or private nature of the rules in question.93 
In Laval,94 the Court took a different approach, and held that grounds of 
public policy could only be relied upon by public bodies.95 It follows that 
service providers discriminating against service recipients cannot be re-
quired by the ruling in Ciola to justify their conduct by reference to public 
policy, public security or public health.
In Viking, the Court held that a trade union could justify collective 
action restricting the exercise of a fundamental freedom by recourse to 
overriding reasons of public interest, such as the protection of workers. 
The option of relying upon overriding reasons of public interest might be 
open to service providers seeking to justify discrimination against recipi-
ents residing in other Member States. But a more straightforward option 
might be available. In Eberhard Haug-Adrion the Court held that offering 
a reduced no-claims bonus in respect of cars with customs plates was 
justifi ed on actuarial grounds. It seems, then, that a service provider 
seeking to justify a refusal to provide a service to a recipient in another 
Member State, or seeking to justify dealing on terms which are discrimi-
natory compared to terms offered to recipients in the same State, may 
do so in one of two ways. The fi rst is on the basis that from the commer-
cial point of view there is no discrimination at all - as in the Eberhard 
Haug-Adrion case. In such a case the service provider may say that for 
commercial reasons it is not profi table to provide its service beyond the 
borders of the Member State in which it is located, or that the different 
terms offered refl ect differences in costs or other factors relevant to pric-
91  Case C-224/97 Ciola v. Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517 para 16. And see generally 
D Wyatt, A Dashwood and others, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, (5th edn, 
Thomson/Sweet and Maxwell, London 2006) 19-039 and 19-040.
92  Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-
Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.
93  Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-
Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 para 86.
94  Case C-341/05 Laval, Judgment of 18 December 2007.
95  Laval para 84. The Court does not refer to its observation in Bosman, despite the fact 
that Advocate General Mengozzi draws the opposite conclusion, citing Bosman. See Opinion 
para 284.
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ing the service for recipients in other Member States. It will be recalled 
that it was argued at the outset that normal market behaviour designed 
to improve the market position of one economic operator should not in 
principle be held to amount to a restriction on the fundamental freedom 
of another market operator. As noted above, a service provider might also 
seek to justify discriminatory treatment of out of State recipients on the 
basis of overriding reasons of public interest. It is perhaps worthy of note 
that the overriding reason of public interest referred to in Viking - the pro-
tection of workers - is itself also a private economic interest, in as much 
as the collective action pursued by the trade union and international fed-
eration of trade unions concerned was aimed at furthering the economic 
interests of trade union members. It is perhaps likely that private market 
operators will most readily be able to invoke those overriding reasons of 
public interest which also refl ect their commercial interests, such as, for 
example, the protection of intellectual property rights. It seems inevitable 
that the kind of justifi cations which a private market operator will seek 
to rely upon in this context will be, in one way or another, economic 
justifi cations, although in the case of action by State authorities, deroga-
tion from fundamental freedoms on economic grounds is not in principle 
permissible.96
It is argued above that purchasing choices of private operators relat-
ing to goods and services do not fall within the scope of Community law 
for the purposes of the general principle of equality, but that sales choic-
es do. It is argued that this distinction is supported by policy considera-
tions, in particular the consideration that it would be excessively burden-
some to impose on private operators the obligation not to favour domestic 
products in their purchasing decisions. Even though they would be free 
to justify decisions favouring domestic products on commercial grounds, 
the risk of being forced to do so in the course of litigation could force pur-
chasers into ‘defensive purchasing’ practice which could lead in practice 
to adherence to the transparency obligations of state purchasing bodies. 
The threat of litigation might even lead some market operators to believe 
that it was safer to buy imports than domestic products. 
It would not seem, however, to be excessively burdensome to impose 
on private operators the obligation not to depart from their normal terms 
and conditions of sale in the case of non nationals or non residents, un-
less such departure represented normal market behaviour. Whereas an 
obligation of non discrimination on purchasers would amount to a posi-
tive obligation to take account of the position of imports, an obligation of 
96  See Wyatt and Dashwood (n 91) 20-049, where it is argued that while ‘economic aims’ in 
the sense of protectionist aims clearly cannot justify derogation from fundamental freedoms, 
it is less clear why non protectionist economic aims, such as avoidance of erosion of the tax 
base, cannot do so.
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non discrimination on purchases would amount to a negative obligation 
not to depart from normal business practice except on normal commer-
cial grounds. It is also argued above that recognising Community com-
petence to regulate such discrimination would be conducive to achieving 
the aims of the internal market, without imposing excessive burdens on 
private market operators.
A possible case in point - excessive ‘roaming’ charges
A possible example of discriminatory service provision contrary to 
the general principle of equality and in particular to Article 12 EC is that 
of excessive ‘roaming’ charges, which have been recently regulated by 
Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and Council. 
A mobile telephone user is a ‘roaming’ customer when that customer has 
a contract with a home provider which permits him or her to make or 
receive calls on a visited network in another Member State, by means of 
arrangements between the home provider and the operator of that visited 
network. The visited network makes charges (‘wholesale’ charges) to the 
home provider, for allowing the roaming customer to use the visited net-
work, and the home provider makes charges (‘retail’ charges) to its cus-
tomer. The reason for the adoption of an EC Regulation regulating these 
wholesale and retail charges was that such charges were regarded as 
being excessive, in the sense of the margin between costs and prices be-
ing wider than would prevail in fully competitive markets.97 The excessive 
retail charges were regarded as resulting from high wholesale charges 
levied by the foreign host network operator and also, in many cases, from 
high retail mark-ups charged by the customer’s own network operator.98 
The preamble noted that ‘reductions in wholesale charges are often not 
passed on to the retail customer.’99 Accordingly, the Regulation imposes 
regulatory obligations at both retail and wholesale level, to protect the 
interests of roaming customers. These regulatory obligations comprise a 
maximum average wholesale charge, and a maximum retail charge.100 
There are two points to make about the situation prevailing prior to 
the adoption of Regulation 717/2007 which seem relevant to the present 
discussion. The fi rst is that the markets in question were not fully com-
petitive markets. This resulted at least in part from the fact that roaming 
services at retail level are not purchased independently but constitute 
only one element of a broader retail package purchased by customers 
97  See Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 preamble, recital (1).
98  See Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 preamble, recital (1).
99  See Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 preamble, recital (1).
100  See Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 in particular arts 3 and 4.
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from their home provider.101 The second point to be made is that the 
retail charges made to roaming customers by their home provider were 
discriminatory in comparison with domestic tariffs, being ‘roughly four 
times higher than domestic tariffs.’102 Since it appears that the exces-
sive and discriminatory retail charges resulted at least in part from high 
wholesale charges, it seems likely that visited networks were imposing 
discriminatorily high wholesale charges on home operators. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that both forms of discrimination existed, they 
would seem to amount to infringements of the general principle of equal-
ity, in particular of Article 12 EC.  
Counter arguments might be raised. In each case it might be said 
that the pricing behaviour of the network operators amounted to normal 
market behaviour; the market might not be fully competitive, but that 
simply means that market operators have more freedom in price fi xing 
than they would otherwise have, and they naturally charge as much as 
they can. It is certainly the view of the present writer that normal market 
behaviour cannot amount to a breach of the general principle of equal-
ity. But a key question which arises is the extent to which a market 
operator can, or should be able to justify discrimination against out of 
state operators, or discrimination against customers solely because they 
have crossed a national frontier, on grounds of normal market behav-
iour, when market conditions are not normal, and the market is not ‘fully 
competitive’? It has been argued above that market operators should be 
permitted to justify discrimination by reference to cost or other consid-
erations which in effect rebut the original inference of discrimination. But 
the case under consideration - roaming charges - is rather different.
If it is correct that the regulation of roaming charges is in fact an 
attempt to eliminate discrimination on grounds of nationality and resi-
dence, it would not seem to be the fi rst time that the Community law-
maker has employed legislation under Article 95 EC for this purpose. 
Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in euro, lays 
down rules on such payments in order to ensure that charges for those 
payments are the same as those for payments within a Member State. 
The preamble states that the fact that the level of charges for cross-bor-
der payments continues to remain higher than the level of charges for 
internal payments ‘is hampering cross-border trade and therefore consti-
tutes an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market’.103 The 
conduct complained of however is the conduct of private parties which 
discriminates on grounds of nationality and/or residence. The explana-
101  See Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 preamble, recital (7).
102  SEC(2006) 926, Commission Staff Working Paper - Executive Summary 2. 
103  Recital 6.
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tory memorandum to the Commission Proposal for the Regulation refers 
to discriminatory charges for the use of cash machines by out of State 
residents as an example of the mischief the Directive is designed to cor-
rect.104
A related issue which arises as regards roaming charges is that of 
the competence of the Community to adopt Regulation 717/2007 under 
Article 95 EC. The use of Article 95 EC as a legal base for such a measure 
was questioned prior to its adoption.105 The preamble does not overtly 
address the question of competence, though it implies that the pricing 
rules it contains will ensure the smooth functioning of the internal mar-
ket for roaming services.106 Normal grounds for regulation under Article 
95 EC or other legal bases for regulating the internal market are that 
disparities between national rules create obstacles to the free movement 
of goods or services, or appreciable distortions of competition, or create 
uncertainty or ‘psychological obstacles’ to individuals or undertakings 
engaged in cross-border economic activities.107 It is not at all obvious that 
any of these grounds for regulation under Article 95 EC exist. Nor can it 
be said to be established that the fact that market operators are engaged 
in economic activity in a market which is not ‘fully competitive’ creates 
an appreciable distortion of competition justifying harmonisation under 
Article 95 EC. It is not surprising that the validity of the Regulation has 
been challenged. In Telefonica O2 and others v Secretary of State for Busi-
ness and Regulation Reform the claimants argued before the Administra-
tive Court in London that the Regulation adopts ‘it is believed uniquely, 
a centralised price control divorced from Article 95 and the requirement 
to remove distortions in and obstacles to competition within the internal 
market.’108 The Administrative Court referred questions to the Court of 
104 See COM(2001) 439 fi nal, Proposal for a Regulation on cross-border payments in euro, 
para 3. 
105  Questions have been raised as to the competence of the Community institutions to 
adopt the Regulation in question under art 95 EC. See House of Lords EU Committee, 17th 
Report of Session 2006-07, Mobile Phone Charges in the EU, Curbing the Excesses, Vol 1: 
The Report, HL Paper 79-1 paras 24, 62, and page 32, referring to objections to the legal 
base by Orange and Vodaphone, and to legal opinions from Sir Francis Jacobs QC and 
David Murray (of 16 October 2006), and from Claus-Dieter Ehlerman (of 27 March 2006).
106  See Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 preamble, recital (4). 
107  See, generally, DA Wyatt, ‘Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market’ 
(2007) SSRN Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 9/2007 (e-pub); abridged version 
published in M Dougan and S Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back 
and Thinking Forward (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008).
108  [2007] EWHC 3018 (Admin) para 11. The questions posed to the European Court are 
as follows: Is Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 invalid, in whole or in part, by reason of the 
inadequacy of art 95 EC as a legal basis? Is art 4 of Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 (together 
with arts 2(a) and 6(3) insofar as they refer to the Eurotariff and obligations relating to the 
Eurotariff) invalid on the grounds that the imposition of a price ceiling in respect of retail 
roaming charges infringes the principle of proportionality and/or subsidiarity?
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Justice of the European Communities under Article 234 EC asking inter 
alia whether the Regulation was invalid in whole or in part by reason of 
the inadequacy of Article 95 EC as a legal base.109
It is noted above, however, that it is arguable that the possible dis-
crimination referred to above regarding roaming charges is contrary to 
the general principle of equality, in particular discrimination on grounds 
of nationality, and by reference to the residence of customers.  If this 
argument is correct, it would mean that the correct procedure had been 
used for the regulation of wholesale roaming charges. If visited network 
operators charged home network operators on a basis that amounted to 
indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality contrary to Article 12 
EC, competence to prohibit such discrimination could be based on Article 
12 EC. The applicable procedure would be that laid down in Article 251 
EC, which is the same procedure as that specifi ed for recourse to Article 
95 EC. The failure to refer to Article 12 EC as a Treaty base would not 
necessarily be an error which would affect the validity of the Regulation.110 
But the question of competence to regulate retail roaming charges raises 
more diffi cult issues. The discrimination involved is not discrimination 
based on nationality, but discrimination based on the fact that the roam-
ing customer is having a service provided in a Member State other than 
that of his or her residence, and other than that of the retail provider. 
This amounts to discrimination on grounds of residence, contrary to the 
general principle of equality, which falls within the scope of application of 
the Treaty, since it falls within the scope of Article 49 EC;  the Court has 
held that Article 49 of the Treaty ‘applies not only where a person provid-
ing services and the recipient thereof are established in different Member 
States, but also in cases where the person providing services offers those 
services in a Member State other than that in which he is established, 
wherever the recipients of those services may be established.’111 It is not 
clear, however, that this situation can be regulated by the Community in-
stitutions under Article 95 EC, and the present writer doubts that such a 
conclusion would be correct. The situation does not fall within the scope 
of Article 49 EC alone, since the latter Article alone does not prohibit dis-
crimination by service providers against service recipients; that is prohib-
ited by the general principle of equality in conjunction with Article 49 EC. 
While that part of the general principle of equality which covers discrimi-
109  The case is listed as Case C-58/08.
110  Cf Case C-491/01 R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte BAT and Imperial Tobacco 
[2002] ECR I-11453 paras 103-111 (superfl uous reference to art 133 EC does not vitiate 
the procedure for adopting a Directive properly based on art 95 since the correct procedure 
- art 251 EC procedure - is used).
111  C-198/89 Commission v. Greece [1991] ECR I-727 paras 8 to 10; Case C-398/95 Syn-
desmos ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion v. Ypourgos Ergasias [1997] ECR 
I-3091 para 8.
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nation on grounds of nationality is subject to Community competence 
under Article 12 EC, by means of the procedure in Article 251 EC, other 
aspects of the general principle of equality, other than the sex equality 
provisions in Article 141 EC, which are also subject to the procedure in 
Article 251 EC, are subject to Community competence under either Ar-
ticle 13 EC, or Article 308 EC. The former Article covers discrimination 
on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation, and Community action is subject to unanimity in 
Council and to consultation of the European Parliament. Legislation to 
prohibit other forms of discrimination may be undertaken under Article 
308 EC, where it is necessary to do so in the course of operation of the 
common market, by the same procedure.112 The Council of the EU has 
determined that discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation may undermine the achievement of the objectives 
of the EC Treaty, including the free movement of persons.113 It would 
seem to follow that Article 308 EC provides competence to regulate retail 
roaming charges, since discriminatory charges place roaming custom-
ers at a disadvantage for having exercised their rights of free movement, 
and rectifi cation of that disadvantage is necessary to attain the objective 
of freedom of movement.114 This latter objective is, moreover, one, inex-
tricably linked to the course of operation of the common market. If the 
foregoing is correct, it would follow that a Regulation on roaming charges 
could be validly adopted as regards the regulation of wholesale roaming 
charges on the basis of Article 12 EC, pursuant to the procedure in Arti-
cle 251 EC, but such a Regulation could not validly regulate retail roam-
ing charges, the legal basis for which would be Article 308 EC. The effect 
of the case law on combining Treaty bases would seem to be that Regula-
tion (EC) No 717/2007 on roaming charges should have been based on 
Article 308 EC.  The main aim of the Regulation is clearly to ensure that 
users of public mobile telephone networks do not pay excessive prices for 
Community- wide roaming services.115 In order to achieve this aim, retail 
prices are subject to control.116 Since one of the causes of excessive retail 
charges is excessive wholesale charges, the latter are also subject to con-
112  Art 308 EC provides: ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in 
the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community 
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
take the appropriate measures.’
113  Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, preamble, recital (11).
114  But not under art 95 EC, since art 95(2) EC excludes from the scope of art 95(1) EC 
provisions relating to the free movement of persons.
115  Recital (1) to preamble art 1.
116  Art 4.
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trol.117 It might be possible to conclude that the control of retail charges 
comprises the main or predominant purpose or component of the Regu-
lation, and that the control of wholesale charges is merely incidental; 
alternatively, and more convincingly, the two objectives are inseparably 
linked. If either analysis is correct, Article 308 EC is the appropriate legal 
basis, rather than Article 95 EC.118 
It is to be noted, however, that the Court of Justice does not take a 
rigorous approach towards questions of competence under Article 95 EC, 
and it is likely that the Court will endorse fairly general arguments justi-
fying the use of Article 95 EC.119 Similar questions as to the appropriate 
Treaty base for the Regulation on roaming charges would seem to arise 
in respect of Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 on cross-border payments 
in euro. 
Horizontal effect of Article 56 EC - capital and payments
Within the framework of the Chapter on capital and payments, all 
restrictions on the movement of capital and on payments between Mem-
ber States and between Member States and third countries are prohib-
ited.120 These provisions are without prejudice to the right of Member 
States to apply relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish 
between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their 
place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is in-
vested.121 A general argument in favour of the horizontal effect of Article 
56 EC is that it does not draw any distinction as to the source - public or 
private - of the restrictions which it prohibits. In the case of other Treaty 
Articles, such as Articles 39 EC and 49 EC, the Court has regarded it as 
a factor favouring the possibility of horizontal effect that these provisions 
do not draw any distinction as to the source of the restrictions on free 
movement which are to abolished or prohibited.122  It is suggested above 
that Article 28 EC applies horizontally solely to that private action which 
seeks to regulate trade or the transit of goods in a way analogous to the 
ways in which State authorities regulate trade or the transit of goods, 
and it is possible that the same conclusion should be adopted for Article 
56 EC. The present writer inclines, however, to the view that Article 56 
117  Recital (1) to preamble art 3.
118  Case C-338/01 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-4829.
119  See, generally, Wyatt (n 107). 
120  Art 56 EC.
121  Art 58(1)(a) EC.
122  Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139 para 30; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch 
[1974] ECR 1405 para 20.
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EC should be read as having solely vertical effect.123 This is based on 
policy grounds. Article 56 EC applies to movement of capital between 
Member States and third countries as well as between Member States. 
It has been held to be directly effective in these respects.124 Excluding 
horizontal direct effect would prevent private operators in Member States 
being vulnerable to actions at the suit of third country market operators 
in circumstances where it is unlikely that such third country operators 
would be similarly vulnerable.125 It is argued below that the position of 
market operators in Member States could be safeguarded by application 
of the general principle of equality; but that the protection of this prin-
ciple should not be extended to nationals of third countries resident in 
third countries.
Although the Treaty does not defi ne the terms ‘movement of capital’ 
and ‘payments’, the case law of the Court of Justice has indicated that 
Directive 88/361,126 together with the nomenclature annexed to it, may 
be used for the purposes of defi ning what constitutes a capital move-
ment.127 It follows that capital movements include, for example, investing 
in a new or existing undertaking with a view to controlling and managing 
that undertaking, and investing in real property in national territory by 
non-residents. Thus, for example, national measures which discourage 
residents of one Member State from purchasing land in the territory of 
another infringe Article 56 EC.128 On the basis of the arguments devel-
oped above in connection with Article 49 EC, it is possible to conclude 
that the general principle of equality, in conjunction with Article 56 EC, 
would prohibit, for example, provisions of the constitution of a company 
incorporated in a Member State which exclude nationals of other Member 
States from acquiring shares in the company. While Article 56 applies to 
capital movements between Member States and between Member States 
and third countries, it cannot be assumed that the general principle of 
equality, and in particular the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
123  Usher argues that art 73b EC, prohibiting restrictions on capital movements between 
Member States and Member States and third countries, might be regarded as having hori-
zontal effect, at any rate as regards capital movements between Member States. See Usher, 
The Law of Money and Financial Services in the European Community (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1994) 26, 27.
124  Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sanz de Lera and Others [1995] ECR 
I-4821.
125  The Court has given weight to generally analogous considerations in the context of WTO 
obligations. See Wyatt, Dashwood and others (n 91) 5-044. 
126  [1988] OJ L 178/5.
127  Case C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661 paras 20 and 21. See Wyatt, 
Dashwood and others (n 91) 20-012.
128  Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099; Case C-370/05 Criminal proceedings against 
Uwe Kay Festersen [2007] ECR I-1129.
39CYELP 4 [2008] 1-48
of nationality in Article 12 EC, will apply to nationals of third countries 
resident in third countries as regards participation in the capital of a 
company registered in a Member State, and it considered that this pos-
sibility should be generally excluded on policy grounds.129 Further refer-
ence to restrictions on fundamental freedoms resulting from provisions of 
the corporate constitution is made in the context of Article 43 EC, below. 
It is also possible to conclude, on the basis of the arguments referred to 
above, that a refusal by a vendor of real property, for example a prop-
erty developer marketing apartments in a new development in a Member 
State, to sell properties to residents of other Member States, would be 
contrary to the general principle of equality, in conjunction with Article 
56 EC. The general principle of equality, in conjunction with Articles 39 
and 43 EC, would seem to lead to the same conclusion as regards an 
employed or self-employed national of one Member State seeking to pur-
chase housing or business premises in the territory of another. The same 
conclusion would seem to follow for all nationals of Member States resi-
dent in the territory of another, on the basis of the Court’s case law in Phil 
Collins and Martinez Sala, referred to above. This would produce similar 
protection against discrimination on grounds of nationality in this con-
text as is provided against discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin under Directive 2000/43/EC, Article 3(1)(h) of which (in conjunc-
tion with Articles 1 and 2) prohibits discrimination on grounds of racial 
or ethnic origin as regards ‘access to and supply of goods and services 
which are available to the public, including housing’ (emphasis added). 
The Directive in question would also seem to prohibit provisions of a cor-
porate constitution which discriminate on racial or ethnic grounds, and 
this point is discussed below in the context of Article 43 EC. Further ref-
erence will be made to capital movement, as appropriate, in the context 
of the discussion of Article 43 EC.
129  Art 57(1) provides that the provisions of Art 56 shall be without prejudice to the applica-
tion to third countries of any restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under national 
or Community law adopted in respect of the movement of capital to or from third countries 
involving direct investment - including in real estate - establishment, the provision of fi nan-
cial services or the admission of securities to capital markets. Moreover, free movement of 
capital between Member States and free movement of capital between third countries can-
not be entirely assimilated, since such movements take place in different legal contexts. See 
Case C-101/05 Skatteverket v A. Judgment of 18 December 2007,   para 60. Thus, in Case 
C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group [2006] ECR I-11753 para 171, the Court stated 
that it may be that a Member State will be able to demonstrate that a restriction on capital 
movements to or from third countries is justifi ed for a particular reason in circumstances 
where that reason would not constitute a valid justifi cation for a restriction on capital move-
ments between Member States.
40 Derrick Wyatt: Horizontal Effect of Fundamenal Freedoms and the Right to Eequality...
The horizontal scope of Article 43 EC - provisions of the corporate 
constitution and action by directors as restrictions on freedom of 
establishment
Discriminatory provisions in the corporate constitution
There seem to be strong grounds for considering that a provision 
of the corporate constitution prohibiting non nationals or non residents 
from acquiring shares in the company would be incompatible with (a) the 
general principle of equality, in particular the prohibition of discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality in Article 12 EC, in conjunction with Arti-
cle 56 EC, and (b) with Article 43 EC, either alone, or in conjunction with 
the general principle of equality/Article 12 EC.130
In the fi rst place, the corporate constitution regulates collectively 
the terms and conditions upon which shares may be bought and sold. 
The purchase of shares falls within the scope of Article 56 EC, compris-
ing either ‘direct investment’, where the acquisition of corporate control 
is involved, or ‘portfolio investment’ where it is not’. Direct investment is 
defi ned as follows by the Court of Justice in Commission v. Belgium:131
Points I and III in the nomenclature set out in Annex I to Directive 
88/361, and the explanatory notes appearing in that annex, indicate 
that direct investment in the form of participation in an undertaking 
by means of a shareholding or the acquisition of securities on the 
capital market constitute capital movements within the meaning of 
Article [56] of the Treaty. The explanatory notes state that direct in-
vestment is characterised, in particular, by the possibility of partici-
pating effectively in the management of a company or in its control.
Referring to the same Directive, the Commission describes ‘portfolio 
investment’ as follows in its 1997 Communication on Certain Legal As-
pects concerning intra-EU Investment:132
In the Directive, the heading ‘Acquisition . . . of domestic securities.’ 
includes, among others, the transaction ‘acquisition by non-resi-
dents’ of shares and bonds in domestic companies on pure fi nancial 
investment grounds, that is, without the aim of exerting any infl u-
ence in the management of the company. Thus, this transaction is 
considered as a form of capital movement. It is also usually known 
in the fi nancial literature as ‘portfolio investment’.
It has been argued above that Article 56 EC could only have hori-
zontal effect in circumstances where private action regulated capital 
130  There is some discussion of this in Wyatt, Dashwood and others (n 91) 20-021.
131  Case C-503/99 [2002] ECR I-4809 para 38.
132  [1997] OJ C 220/15. See also The Commission’s 2005 Communication on Intra-EU 
investment in the fi nancial services sector [2005] OJ C 293/2.
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movement in the same way as state action regulates the market. This 
would allow for the possibility that a provision of a corporate constitu-
tion which excluded non residents from acquiring shares in the company 
would amount to suffi cient collective regulation of the market in shares 
to attract the horizontal effect of Article 56 EC. As indicated above, how-
ever, the present writer inclines to the view that Article 56 EC should be 
construed as having solely vertical effect. The purchase of shares in a 
company incorporated in a Member State by residents of other Member 
States would however fall within the scope of Article 56 EC. Restrictions 
on such acquisition in the corporate constitution would amount to indi-
rect discrimination on grounds of nationality contrary to Article 12 EC, 
and the latter Article would seem to be capable of horizontal effect in such 
circumstances. It would follow that nationals of Member States could rely 
on the horizontal effect of the Treaty in such circumstances, but nationals 
of third countries could not, unless resident in a Member State, in which 
case reliance might still be placed on the general principle of equality.
Article 43 EC aims to remove discriminatory restrictions on the pur-
suit of self employed activities and the management of undertakings. The 
Court has held that ‘a national of a Member State who has a holding in 
the capital of a company established in another Member State which 
gives him defi nite infl uence over the company’s decisions and allows him 
to determine its activities is exercising his right of establishment’.133 It 
follows that an individual or company seeking to acquire such a hold-
ing would also fall within the scope of the right of establishment. Would 
a provision of the corporate constitution prohibiting non nationals from 
acquiring shares in a company be incompatible with Article 43 EC?
Such a provision would regulate access to the self employed activity 
of management of a corporate undertaking, and it would seem to do so 
collectively, in the sense that the restriction would apply to all those hold-
ing shares, and to all those wishing to purchase shares from such per-
sons with a view to acquiring control of the company in question. Article 
7(4) of Regulation 1612/68/EEC nullifi es clauses of individual or collec-
tive agreements concerning inter alia eligibility for employment which lay 
down or authorise discriminatory conditions in respect of workers who 
are nationals of other Member States. In Walrave and Koch the Court of 
Justice cites this provision in support of the proposition that Article 39 
EC ‘extends likewise to agreements and rules which do not emanate from 
public authorities’.134 The Court’s reasoning in this respect is supported 
by its later judgment in Rutili, in which the Court holds that Regulation 
133  Case C-251/98 C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen 
Gorinchem [2000] ECR I-2787 paras 21 and 22.
134  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 paras 21 and 22. 
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1612/68/EEC does not create any new rights, but lays down the scope 
and detailed rules for the exercise of rights conferred directly by the Trea-
ty.135 In Walrave and Koch the Court adds that the activities referred to in 
Article 49 EC are not be distinguished by their nature from those in Ar-
ticle 39 EC, but only by the fact that they are performed outside the ties 
of a contact of employment.136 Precisely the same point of course holds 
good for Article 43 EC.  If Article 39 EC has horizontal effect as regards 
‘agreements and rules’ which do not emanate from public authorities and 
which impose discriminatory rules regarding access to employed activi-
ties, it would seem to follow that Article 43 EC has horizontal effect as 
regards rules laid down by agreement in a corporate constitution exclude 
non-nationals from the self-employed activity of managing a corporate 
undertaking. This line of argument receives further support from the fact 
that Article 8 of Regulation 1612/68/EEC guarantees equality for work-
ers as regards membership of trade unions, and the exercise of rights 
attaching thereto such as voting rights.  If Article 39 EC grants equality 
to employed persons as regards membership and voting rights in private 
law bodies such as trade unions, it is diffi cult to see why Article 43 EC 
should not grant similar equality to self-employed persons as regards 
membership and voting rights in private law bodies such as companies. 
The present writer would conclude that Article 43 EC prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of nationality in the provisions of corporate 
constitutions where the consequence is to prevent nationals of Member 
States from acquiring control of and taking part in the management of 
corporate bodies. Even if this effect could not be derived from Article 43 
EC itself, it would seem to follow from Article 12 EC, since the purchase 
by a national of one Member State of a controlling shareholding in a 
company established in the territory of another falls within the scope of 
Article 43 EC. 
If the foregoing conclusion is correct, it would seem that in this re-
spect protection against discrimination on grounds of nationality is simi-
lar to protection against discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds under 
Directive 2000/43/EC, Article 3(1)(a) of which prohibits discrimination 
on racial or ethnic grounds as regards conditions for access to self-em-
ployment, and Article 14 of which requires Member States to declare null 
and void or amend inter alia the internal rules of undertakings.
Non discriminatory restrictions in the corporate constitution
If the foregoing argument is correct, to the effect that Article 43 EC 
prohibits discriminatory provisions of the corporate constitution because 
135  Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497 para 28. 
136  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 para 23.
43CYELP 4 [2008] 1-48
Article 43 EC has horizontal effect as regards contractual rules which 
collectively regulate eligibility for the conduct of self-employed activities, 
or contractual rules which establish and regulate private law bodies such 
as trade unions or companies, that horizontal effect is not necessarily 
confi ned to discriminatory provisions, but may apply also to non dis-
criminatory provisions which hinder or make less attractive the exercise 
of a fundamental freedom, providing that the provisions in question are 
not a manifestation of normal market activity. 
The Court of Justice seems to accept in the BAA case that trade in 
the shares of a company can comprise a market, restrictions on access 
to which may be incompatible with Article 56 EC on capital movement. 
Considering provisions of the corporate constitution which limited any 
shareholder to a maximum holding of 15% of the equity shares in the 
company concerned, and which gave rights of prior approval over certain 
transactions (principally the sale of a designated airport, or winding up of 
the company) to a British government minister by virtue of his ownership 
of a single £1 ‘special share’, the Court held:
In this instance, although the relevant restrictions on investment 
operations apply without distinction to both residents and non-resi-
dents, it must none the less be held that they affect the position of a 
person acquiring a shareholding as such and are thus liable to deter 
investors from other Member States from making such investments 
and, consequently, affect access to the market…137
In the case in question, the restrictions were attributable to the 
State. It might be said that, if the same provisions had been adopted by 
private shareholders, without the participation of the State, the relevant 
arrangements would not have deterred investors from making such in-
vestments, and would not have amounted to restrictions on capital move-
ment. While this argument might be plausible as regards the powers of 
prior approval of the special shareholder of decisions to sell designated 
airports or wind up the company, it is not really plausible as regards the 
15% equity limitation. The reason why that limitation deters investors is 
that it makes investment with a view to exercising a controlling infl uence 
over the company impossible. The fact that the limitation was introduced 
at the behest of the State and maintained by virtue of the existence of 
the special share held by the State cannot really detract from this funda-
mental point. It is diffi cult to avoid the conclusion that an equity limita-
tion in a corporate constitution, introduced by private shareholders, and 
maintained by the existence of a special share in the hands of a private 
shareholder, could amount to a restriction on capital movement, and 
a restriction on freedom of establishment. While doubts have been ex-
137  Case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641 para 47.
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pressed by the present writer about the horizontal effect of Article 56 EC, 
it has been argued that there are no grounds for entertaining the same 
doubts as regards Article 43 EC.
It has however also been argued that normal market behaviour on 
the part of one market operator cannot in itself amount to a restriction 
the fundamental freedom of another. Could our hypothetical equity limi-
tation - imposed and maintained solely by private action - be defended 
on the ground that it comprises normal market behaviour? It is to be 
noted that such a limitation would neither enable shareholders, nor the 
company itself, to maintain or improve their position on the market; it 
would entrench the position of the board of the company, and deny ac-
cess to the market in corporate control by preventing such a market from 
operating. On the face of it, such a limitation could not be regarded as 
normal market behaviour. It would seem to amount to a serious restric-
tion on the right of establishment, and would require to be justifi ed by a 
mandatory requirement in the general interest. In such circumstances it 
would be necessary to consider the rationale of the corporate structure. 
Suppose the company concerned published a newspaper and that the eq-
uity limitation backed by the special share had been established as part 
of a scheme to ensure editorial independence for the newspaper in ques-
tion.138 Any restrictions on freedom of establishment might be justifi ed by 
the public interest in press diversity.139
Action taken by the board of a company to frustrate a takeover 
bid
Similar arguments might apply to measures permitted by or adopted 
under a corporate constitution, which are intended to and do restrict ac-
cess to the market in corporate control. Into this category might fall cer-
tain conduct of the kind referred to in Article 9(2) of Directive 2004/25/
EC on take-over bids, taken to frustrate a bid, without the consent of the 
general meeting, where a Member State has opted out of the latter pro-
vision.140 The following is a selective account of aspects of the Directive 
intended to provide context for the discussion of the possible horizontal 
effect of Article 43 EC.141 Article 9(2) of the take-over Directive provides:
138  The present writer is conscious of the loose parallel with the arrangements applicable 
to Reuters when it was fl oated in 1984.
139  Cf Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689.
140  See, in general, Wyatt, Dashwood and others (n 91) 20-036, 20-037.  See also Guus 
Kemperink and Jules Stuyck, ‘The Thirteen Company Law Directive and Competing Bids,’ 
(2008) 45 CML Rev 115-119.
141  For an excellent analysis of the history and terms of the Takeover Bid Directive, see Tho-
mas Papadopoulos, ‘The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids: Directive 2004/25/
EC’ (2008) 6 (3) ICCLJ 13-102. 
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During the period referred to in the second subparagraph [viz., while 
a bid is pending], the board of the offeree company shall obtain the 
prior authorisation of the general meeting of shareholders given for 
this purpose before taking any action, other than seeking alternative 
bids, which may result in the frustration of the bid and in particular 
before issuing any shares which may result in a lasting impediment 
to the offeror’s acquiring control of the offeree company.142
The Commission’s explanatory memorandum says of the draft text 
of the above:
Where control of the offeree company is at stake, it is important to 
ensure that its fate is decided by its shareholders. The authorisa-
tion of the general meeting must therefore be given explicitly with a 
view to responding to a specifi c bid….The Directive does not defi ne 
the measures which can frustrate a bid. In general, such measures 
may be all operations which are not carried out in the normal course 
of the company’s business or not in conformity with normal market 
practices.143
The effect of Article 9(2) is that, apart from seeking alternative bids, 
the board is precluded from adopting other ‘defensive’ measures (e.g., 
poison pills, sale of crown jewels etc.144) without the prior consent of the 
general meeting, if they may result in the frustration of the bid. But this 
and other provisions are subject to opt out and reciprocity provisions.145 
The Directive allows Member States to opt out of the rules on defensive 
measures for companies registered in their territories. Companies regis-
tered in those Member States which have opted out must nevertheless 
be allowed to opt in if they wish. And Member States may authorise com-
panies otherwise subject to Articles 9(2) not to apply that regime if they 
142  Art 9(3) makes the following provision for the general meeting which decides on any 
defensive measures: ‘Restrictions on voting rights provided for in the articles of association 
of the offeree company shall not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which 
decides on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9.
Restrictions on voting rights provided for in contractual agreements between the offeree 
company and holders of its securities, or in contractual agreements between holders of the 
offeree company’s securities entered into after the adoption of this Directive, shall not have 
effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in 
accordance with Article 9.
Multiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at the general meeting of sharehold-
ers which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9.’
143  COM (2002) 534 fi nal 8.
144  A ‘poison pill’ gives rights to existing shareholders if a hostile bidder takes control; the 
‘sale of crown jewels’ involves selling valuable assets of the company. See, for example, 
Kirchner and Painter, ‘Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth 
EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for 
Reform’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 451, 452.
145  Art 12. 
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are the subject of a takeover by a company which does not apply that 
regime.146  A possible legal argument against the opt out and reciprocity 
provisions of the Directive is that they authorise at least some defensive 
conduct by the board of an offeree company which would seem to amount 
to an infringement of the right of establishment of a bidding company. 
The rationale of the takeover Directive, referring in its preamble fi rst 
and foremost to Article 44(1) EC, which has as its aim freedom of es-
tablishment, is clearly to achieve freedom of establishment, and the as-
sumption underlying Article 9(2) of the Directive, which prohibits con-
duct likely to frustrate a bid without the prior authority of the general 
meeting, seems to be that such defensive conduct, unless taken with 
the prior authorisation of the general meeting, constitutes an obstacle 
to the freedom of establishment. It is interesting that the Commission’s 
commentary on the original proposal for ‘undiluted’ Article 9(2) regards 
defensive measures as not being ‘carried out in the normal course of the 
company’s business’ and not being ‘in conformity with normal market 
practices’. This is consistent with the approach of the present writer to 
the effect that normal market behaviour cannot in principle amount to 
a restriction on the fundamental freedom of market operators, but that 
behaviour other than normal market behaviour can constitute such a 
restriction if, inter alia, it restricts access to the market.
The fact that Article 9(2) is drafted so as to cover all defensive conduct 
of the board likely to hinder exercise of the right of establishment does 
not necessarily mean that all conduct incompatible with the latter Article 
would also be incompatible with the right of establishment of a bidder. 
Article 9(2) is a preventative rule which protects the interests of bidder and 
shareholders by requiring the consent of the general meeting in all cases to 
action of the kind referred to. So if the general meeting of a company gives 
authority to the board, in advance of any bid being made, to adopt certain 
defensive measures to protect shareholders from inadequate offers, and on 
the basis that such defensive measures are likely to increase the ability of 
the target company to negotiate a higher premium, it will be inconsistent 
with Article 9(2) for the board to take such defensive measures.
Yet it is not at all clear that action taken by the board in such cir-
cumstances should be considered to amount to an infringement of Article 
43 EC. It has been suggested that non discriminatory activities by or on 
behalf of market operators to improve their market position vis-à-vis their 
competitors or their suppliers or customers, are not in principle and in 
general to be regarded as restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of 
others, though discriminatory conduct on the part of market operators, 
146  It is debateable whether reciprocity may only be invoked by companies which have 
opted into the art 9(2) regime, or all companies subject to that regime. The present writer 
adopts the latter view. But it is not really signifi cant to the present discussion.
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or activities which restrict the access to the market of other market op-
erators, would seem capable of amounting to such restrictions. If this 
analysis is correct, conduct of the kind described above; viz., defensive 
measures authorised in advance of a bid but with a view to protecting 
shareholders from inadequate bids, and increasing the premium for con-
trol, cannot be regarded as a restriction on the right of establishment. 
On the other hand, Article 43 EC would seem to impose some limits 
on the consequences of opting out of Article 9(2), as would Article 3(c) of 
the Directive, and the latter provision might be read as aiming in part to 
ensure that opting out of Article 9(2) remains compatible with Article 43 
EC. Opting out of Article 9(2) does not suspend or create an exception to 
application of the general principle laid down in Article 3 (c) of the Direc-
tive, to the effect that ‘the board of an offeree company must act in the in-
terests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of secu-
rities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid’ (emphasis added). 
Opting out of Article 9(2) would not seem to authorise defensive action by 
a board which frustrates a bid which is manifestly adequate and thereby 
deny shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid. On 
this view, opting out of Article 9(2) authorises the board to take defensive 
action to protect shareholders from inadequate bid, but not to deprive 
shareholders of the right to take advantage of manifestly adequate bids. 
To read the authorisation to opt out of Article 9(2) otherwise would be 
incompatible with Article 3 (c); at any rate where a bidder is incorporated 
in a Member State and entitled to rely upon Article 43 EC.147 A bidder 
incorporated in a third country would not be entitled to rely upon Article 
56 EC if the latter Article has solely vertical effect. Nor would such a bid-
der be entitled to rely upon the general principle of equality, if the argu-
ment advanced above to this effect is correct. In any event, in the case of 
a bidder incorporated in a third country Article 56 EC might be subject 
to exception pursuant to Article 57(1) EC.148
It follows that, in the view of the present writer, opting out of Article 
9(2) will still leave certain conduct caught by the latter Article prohibited 
by the Directive, because such conduct would place the board in default 
of Article 43 EC - at any rate, in the case of bids by companies incorpo-
rated in Member States. In principle, any defensive measure, other than 
seeking alternative bids, might fall within this category, if it has the conse-
quence of frustrating a manifestly adequate bid. Conduct which amounts 
to a restriction on the right of establishment, however, may be justifi ed by 
overriding reasons in the public interest, such as the protection of work-
147  Art 43 EC applies only to companies or fi rms formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered offi ce, central administration or principal place of 
business within the Community. See art 48 EC.
148  See n 129.
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ers, subject to the principle of proportionality. It might be diffi cult in prac-
tice to demonstrate that the frustration of a bid to take over a company 
amounting to a proportionate measure to protect the employees of the 
company, or the jobs created by the activities of the company.149
Conclusion
The judgments in Viking and Laval confi rm the Court’s previous case 
law on the horizontal effect of Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC, and extend the 
horizontal effect of Articles 43 and 49 EC to cover collective action of 
trade unions by way of strikes, boycotts and the like. One effect of this 
is an extension of Community regulatory competence to cover this same 
subject matter, despite the contrary indications in Article 137(5) EC.  The 
judgment in Viking implies that Article 28 EC is also capable of horizon-
tal effect, at least in cases where collective action of individuals produces 
regulatory effects similar to those resulting from State action. This devel-
opment also implies corresponding Community competence to regulate 
such conduct. The Court’s reasoning leaves room for future incremental 
increases in the horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms in cases which 
involve contractual rules, in particular rules regulating employed or self 
employed activities, or conduct authorised by such rules, or which sim-
ply involve the exercise by private bodies of their legal autonomy. The ap-
proach to horizontal effect in Viking, for example, supports the argument 
that provisions of a corporate constitution could amount to a restriction 
on freedom of establishment, as could certain action taken by the board 
of a company to frustrate a takeover bid. A related issue is the horizontal 
effect of the fundamental principle of equality, apparently endorsed in 
the Mangold case. Even a restrained reading of Mangold would suggest 
that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 
12 EC might have horizontal effect in circumstances falling within the 
material scope of Community law, such as the supply of goods, services, 
and business accommodation. A similar conclusion could be reached as 
regards discrimination in the sale of goods, services and real property to 
non residents. In the view of the present writer, it would not be exces-
sively burdensome in such circumstances to impose on private market 
operators the obligation not to depart from their normal terms and condi-
tions of sale, in the case of non-nationals or non-residents, unless such 
departure represented normal market behaviour.
149  In Case C-112/05 Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2007] ECR I-8995, the 
Court held that provisions of the ‘Volkswagen Law’ were liable to deter investors from other 
Member States from investing in the company’s capital, and that this amounted to an in-
fringement of art 56 EC. The Court rejected on proportionality grounds the arguments that 
the contested arrangements were necessary to protect workers’ interests and to protect jobs 
created by the activities of Volkswagen. See paras 74 and 80.
